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Much of the land upon which the Barclays Center was built, and where several luxury 
residential towers have either been built or are slated to go up, was acquired through eminent 
domain. The statute of eminent domain grants the government the power to seize private 
property and convert it into public use, so long as the owner is justly compensated. While the law 
is concise, the judiciary has held that while the question as to whether a taking is for public use is 
judicial (Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, (1930)), the judiciary’s capacity “in determining 
whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one” (Berman 
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). These decisions taken in conjunction have yielded a socio-
legal landscape of constant-deferment, with no court willing to circumscribe the statute’s 
limitations through concrete precedent. Despite the use of eminent domain to take the lands for 
the Pacific Park (née Atlantic Yards1) – Barclays Center project, in a 2009 interview with Crain’s 
Magazine, lead developer Bruce Ratner suggested that the project’s plans would remain private: 
“Why should they get to see the plans?” he asked. “This isn’t a public project” (Agovino 2009). 
Pacific Park is a redevelopment project near downtown Brooklyn, currently underway 
and led by developer Forest City Ratner (FCR). The project’s original plan encompassed a 
professional sports stadium, 16 high-rise mixed-use buildings, and the promised renewal of 
Vanderbilt Yard, a train depot that the Metropolitan Transit Authority uses to store Long Island 
Rail Road train cars in need of repair. The project was officially announced on December 10th, 
 
1 The project was initially called ‘Atlantic Yards’ by the developer, Forest City Ratner (FCR). 
After years of legal strife and community resistance, and following the purchase of a majority of 
shares in the 14 yet-unbuilt high rises by the Chinese development company Greenland 
Corporation, the project was re-dubbed ‘Pacific Park’ in an attempt to save face and rebrand. The 
state still officially refers to the project as ‘Atlantic Yards’, leaving the proper nomenclature 
rather elusive (Oder, 2014).  
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2003, in a presentation targeted at then-NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg and potential investors. 
The announcement centered around the acquisition of the New Jersey Nets basketball team, a 
professional team in the NBA that was to be the lynchpin and anchor business for the planned 
stadium (Bagli 2003). Since that 2003 announcement, the project has undergone multiple 
changes, and has been the subject of legal challenges from the community who would be 
displaced by the planned development.  
While the Atlantic Yards site has a long and contentious history in New York City, the 
recent use of eminent domain brings into conversation a variety of debates surrounding the 
political economy and democratization of development. Ratner’s claim that the project is not 
public conflicts with general notions about the meaning and role of the public (and its corollary, 
the public good), in the language and politics of development. But beyond the popular 
imagination of development, the project has evoked deeper reflections on the direction of urban 
planning in New York. In so doing, a diverse array of spatial imaginaries – simultaneous, 
overlapping, fluid, and conflicting – about what the ideal city or neighborhood looks like have 
been sublimated out of the project and its resistances. The legal, spatial, and economic 
entanglements connecting local development to socio-political power have captured a snapshot 
of those imaginaries through the documents produced in support of, and in opposition to, the 
project. 
Struggles over the power to define the public, in this instance, are given a forum through 
the usage of eminent domain and the ensuing socio-legal battle. In the case of the Atlantic Yards 
– Barclays Center project, a diverse set of stakeholders surfaced in the struggle over that 
definition. Understanding those stakeholders and interpreting clearly their divergent 
conceptualizations of neighborhood, community, and public good is instructive for 
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understanding the process of development, its struggles, and its impacts on social, economic, 
political, and physical space. Furthermore, in the Atlantic Yards – Barclays Center case, eminent 
domain plays a considerable role in the negotiation of public identity, as it simultaneously 
empowers certain types of land-use change while also opening avenues of legalistic recourse for 
the communities being subjected to development. 
As the eminent domain ruling began to take the spotlight in the public conversation of 
how the project site should be developed, the visions for the site held by stakeholders on all sides 
were captured in various media, legalistic artifacts, artworks, and community dialogues. In order 
to understand the relationship connecting eminent domain and notions of the public good to 
development paradigms and power-relations in New York City, this thesis interprets and 
deconstructs those textual artifacts as embodied spatial imaginaries. Representations not just of 
the project site, but of possible places and places of possibility that occupy the site’s footprint, 
were enunciated through the ensuing legal battle. 
What happened (and continues to happen) around the development site near downtown 
Brooklyn is instructive. The use of eminent domain, the challenges against that use, and the 
organization of resident stakeholders in opposition to the stakeholders underwriting and driving 
the development process, produced a rich library of textual artifacts across diverse media. 
Deconstructing and analyzing these documents points to conceptualizations of place and scale, 
filtered through and attuned to legal norms and systems, that confounds popular notions of scale 
in the broader community development conversation. Different stakeholders exercised the power 
to define the public and the public good differently, according to their spatial and scalar 
imaginations. Supporting the theorization in geographic work that destabilizes traditional 
hierarchical conceptualizations of space and scale (e.g., Marsten 2000), the distance between 
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actors’ scalar imaginations and the ramifications of their actions are often messy and 
incongruous. In the eminent domain proceedings challenging the Pacific Park project, resident 
activists – who strategically deploy a ‘local’ conception of scale to achieve their political goals – 
confront constellations of city, state, national, and international power. Likewise, the developers 
and their allies, across a variety of jurisdictions including national lines, are enabled by the 
combinatorial power of politics and finance to impose change on a small swath of land in 
Brooklyn.  
These spatial imaginaries are embodied in the artifacts produced through eminent domain 
proceedings, and point to a rift between the ways in which the various players deploy scale 
(usually along traditional scalar hierarchies), and the felt impact at the site of development 
(which defies those traditional hierarchies and begs for another explanation). That different 
stakeholders’ spatial imaginaries, when considered in the context of their actions and outcomes, 
confound hierarchical conceptions of scale, scratches against a basic problem in the framing of 
eminent domain. In contemporary geographic thought, eminent domain is usually described as 
just one of many legal and political powers deployed by the state to push the city along certain 
axes of development.   
  A new need surfaces, then, to (re)conceptualize eminent domain; to interpret it as not 
just a legal statute but as an intervention that reveals complex entanglements in the built 
environment. Through the deconstruction of textual artifacts produced during legal challenges to 
the eminent domain taking in the Pacific Park Case, this thesis argues that eminent domain 
should be reimagined as a socio-legal process characterized by its tendency to transcend and 
transmute scalar imaginaries. If not through the statute’s deployment, then through the debates 
that arise during legal challenges, eminent domain relays the power to produce change in the 
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built environment in ways that resist traditional hierarchical theorizations on scale. The statute, 
in this sense, constitutes a forum in which stakeholders on either side of a dispute may influence 
the built environment through means that confound even those actors’ own scalar imaginations 
of community, self, and power.   
Of considerable importance to the reframing of eminent domain as process is the notion 
that both law and space are mutually constitutive. As Antonio Azuela and Rodrigo Meneses-
Reyes suggest, the law “serves as a means to produce and reproduce an imaginary spatial 
cohesion in an urban space of conflicting values and expectations” (2014). But the law, in 
providing mechanisms for ordering contested imaginaries into a “particular reality” (Blomley 
2003, 29), does more than determine which imaginary is realized, and which are dismissed. As 
made clear in the outcomes stemming thus far from the Atlantic Yards eminent domain ruling, 
law simultaneously provided the mechanisms for the transferrance of land essential to the 
project’s construction, whilst constituting legitimate avenues for the project’s opponents to 
disrupt the development process. David Delaney’s concept of the ‘nomosphere’ (2010) – a 
framework for binding the spatial and the legal that elevates the dynamic co-productive nature of 
their relationship – is instructive in the proceeding line of inquiry. Today’s downtown Brooklyn 
– which resembles neither the developers’ nor the opposing residents’ exact imaginaries – attests 
to the combinatorial characteristics of how law orders space.  
What becomes necessary, then, is a synthesis of postmodern critical legal frameworks 
that allows for multiple legalities of space (von Benda-Beekman et al. 2014) and grapples with 
the intertwinements between those legalities and contemporary geographical work on scale. Such 
a framework allows for a holistic reading of the Atlantic Yards project and its struggles that 
accounts for the multiple socio-spatial and socio-legal imaginaries represented amongst the 
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various actors in the debate. Furthermore, such an analytical framework takes into account the 
ways in which the deployment of eminent domain resists conventional hierarchical 
conceptualizations of scale as an attribute of contemporary urban life. In view of the notion that 
the cost of private property’s autonomy and propriety is some degree of public responsibility 
(Blomley 2005), a focus on the public use clause of the eminent domain taking acquires unique 
significance for understanding the project and its struggles. A geographic interrogation of 
eminent domain, then, is long overdue.  
This thesis’ second chapter brings into dialogue the various theories that guide the 
ensuing analysis. Critical legal geography and feminist urban geography in combination provide 
much of the backbone for this analysis. Nomosphericity is given particular attention, in that the 
concept’s openness allows for different theorizations for different actors. The residents’ work in 
challenging the eminent domain taking for the Pacific Park project demands a different 
theorization than, for example, the logical underpinnings driving the project’s developers and 
financiers. The nomosphere allows for these different theories to exist in contact with one 
another, while simultaneously centering the intertwinements of legality and spatiality.  
In the third chapter, I discuss eminent domain as it is popularly conceived. Clearly 
delimiting the boundaries of eminent domain as a statute of law, at least so far as those 
boundaries have been established by the judiciary, is of critical importance. The history of 
eminent domain, and transitions in the accepted reasons underlying its deployment, must be 
established to properly consider the statute in its current usage. Furthermore, historical 
deployments of eminent domain not just at the local level, but specifically in New York City, are 
outlined. I argue that in the Pacific Park case, eminent domain constituted an avenue for 
legitimate challenges to city-wide development paradigms. At the same time, however, the 
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statute circumscribed forms of resistance, making other enunciated visions for the project site 
illegitimate.  
The fourth chapter of this paper provides a detailed history of the project site, outlining 
the trajectory of its development up to and including the Atlantic Yards project. In that the 
current Barclay’s Center stadium was not the first sports arena imagined at this location, the 
history of the site inculcates the persistence of development visions for urban places.  
The fifth and sixth chapters analyze the legal and multimedia artifacts produced by the 
projects’ developers and opposition, respectively. Here, the documents are interpreted as 
embodied spatial imaginaries. The legal battle surrounding the eminent domain taking, in this 
sense, is understood as constituting a discourse between and about different visions of 
community development in the wedge-shaped area bordered by Atlantic Avenue, Vanderbilt 
Avenue, Flatbush Avenue, and Dean Street that make up the project’s footprint. 
In the seventh chapter, those multiple imaginaries are re-processed through the lens of 
contemporary legal geography. This framework makes room for the multiple imaginaries of 
community development while also bringing into focus the ways in which legal proceedings 
legitimize certain visions while foreclosing others. Consequently, many of the embodied spatial 
imaginaries produced by those in opposition to the development are unrecognized by the 
judiciary. Highlighting those visions that are given consideration, along with those that are 
dismissed, helps clarify the relationship between legal practice and resistance. By defining the 
boundaries of legitimate opposition to certain modes of development, legality simultaneously 
allows for resistance and circumscribes how resistance might take shape.   
In my concluding chapter, I argue that a reoriented understanding of eminent domain may 
help scratch the surface of how complex dynamics of power undergird development in New 
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York City. In particular, I argue that eminent domain ought to be conceptualized as a spatio-legal 
process that legitimizes certain spatial imaginations and erases others, and which is characterized 
by the tendency to “jump scale” (Smith 1992) in conventional terms, despite existing and 
operating in sites that reflect a flat topology (Masrston et al. 2005), or to otherwise confound 
traditional hierarchies of scale. Rethinking eminent domain thusly, it is possible to penetrate the 
walls that the statute itself erects around legitimate and illegitimate visions of community 





II. Theoretical Framework 
 
How else to see the Pacific Park project than as one of targeted, bourgeois development? 
As a project aimed at remaking the city in an image amenable to the class of real estate moguls, 
business owners, and financiers? As a process that necessarily removes the poor and justifies that 
removal through legally institutionalized moralizing? And through that removal, reproduces the 
poor elsewhere, creating new spaces ripe for development? Indeed, the method that Engels calls 
“Haussmann” captured this very process in 1872. He writes,  
“No matter how different the reasons may be, the result is always the same; the 
scandalous alleys disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self-praise by the bourgeoisie 
on account of this tremendous success, but they appear again immediately somewhere 
else … The breeding places of disease the infamous holes and cellars in which the 
capitalist mode of production confines our workers night after night, are not abolished; 
they are merely shifted elsewhere!” (1935, 74-77, cited in Harvey 2012, 16-17) 
 
Without a doubt, the Atlantic Yards project fits the mold of Haussmann-ization that Engels 
describes, and which has been expounded on throughout the literature on the political economy 
of development. Certain facets of the development’s land taking are almost stranger than fiction 
in how closely they reflect destructive processes outlined over a century prior. The use of blight 
as a justification for the eminent domain taking, thereby invoking an argument that the project 
was for the public good, for example, reconstitutes a legacy of blight and sanitation takings 
targeting ‘the breeding places of disease’ noted by Engels. 
 Traditional political economy is useful to the inquiry at hand, but can only take us so far. 
If this paper’s goal was to understand how the eminent domain taking was made possible, then a 
political economy approach might suffice. But a line of inquiry aimed at understanding the role 
of legal practice in circumscribing conflicts of spatial visions must be able to address more than 
just one of those visions. Geographers, especially legal geographers, have at their disposal 
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analytical frameworks and tools that are uniquely well-suited to address the complex spatialities 
and legalities at play in the Atlantic Yards project. The development, however, has received little 
consideration in the discipline.  
Despite the obviously spatial implications of the Atlantic Yards project, it has garnered 
more attention from legal academia than from social scientists working in spatial disciplines. 
Legal scholars have discussed the shifting paradigms of eminent domain takings made legible in 
the Atlantic Yards – Barclays Center case (Lavine & Oder 2010), the manipulations of “public 
use’s” fuzzy definition (Kleeger 2011), and the relationship between mobile transnational capital 
and urban mega-projects (Schragger 2009). In part, the extensive consideration given to the 
project by legal scholars (and the lack of attention from geographers) stems from the 
overwhelmingly legalistic nature of the textual artifacts produced through the site’s development 
and contestations.  
While legal academics are well-equipped to interpret judicial decisions’ intent and 
meaning through the framework of precedent, they lack certain analytical techniques available to 
geographers. Precedent as a concept in particular generates a hard to navigate terrain, as the use 
of decisions from one case as guiding tenets in others de facto flattens the (multiple intertwined, 
internally tumultuous) spatialities of each. While some legal academics have made the call in 
their own field to embrace political geographic theory (e.g. Ford 1994), the hands reaching 
across the aisle have never fully clasped. By predominantly investigating the particular realities 
created and recreated through law, legal academics largely situate the spatial within the legal. In 
doing so, they obfuscate the dynamic co-production of the two, the ways in which spaces give 
rise to legal practice, and the law gives rise to spatial practice.  
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This is not to say that legal artifacts and techniques are unimportant or outdated. The 
performance of the legal constitutes a primary force in the construction of differentiated places, 
and legal geography often interprets places as both socio-legal and socio-spatial materialities. 
But legal performativity itself depends on space to provide a variety of geographies upon which 
it can act (Blomley 2014). In other words, there is no law without space.  
The nature of conventional judicial frameworks, however, renders those inter-
dependencies invisible because precedent asserts that what works in one place will work in 
others. In this way, the practice of law (e.g., how laws are written, renegotiated, and enforced) 
erases from view diverse spatial imaginaries which constitute the very arena for legal practice. 
Recognizing legal constructions of space as imaginaries that are made real through mechanisms 
of measurement, representation and enforcement (Santos 1987), the judicial legacies of the 
Atlantic Yards project must be interpreted through a discursive framework incorporating both 
legal and geographic analytical practices.  
Blomley argues that recognizing legality and spatiality as codependent is one thing, but 
understanding how such legal geographies work is another entirely. Using this lack of knowledge 
as a point of departure, he writes “At least two questions seem to present themselves. First, how 
do the subjects of law ‘take up’ legal meaning? This is not entirely clear” (2014, 78). He notes 
that critical legal studies and the body of work on legal consciousness would argue that law 
shapes beliefs and thoughts, citing David Engel’s (1998) work. But this answer stemming from 
legal academia is, unfortunately, still insufficient. Indeed, Engel’s line of reasoning invites more 
questioning when reframed through a geographic lens. Blomley consequently pushes back, 
questioning how that process of shaping belief proceeds, what the role of spatiality in the 
“constitution of legal identity and practice” is, and where the law resides in our day to day 
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encounters (2014, 78). What Blomley points to in this encounter is the failure of legal academia 
to sufficiently fold spatiality into its consideration of how legal practice operates.  
If legal minds are inclined to elevate legal practice in their conceptualization of how law 
governs space, it should come as no surprise. Legal geographers have overwhelmingly fallen into 
a similar trap in their tendency to privilege spatial practice over legal practice. A legal geography 
that is radically open to both multiple spatialities and multiple legalities simultaneously is 
necessary to deconstruct the real, messy, and frequently illogical interactions that make the 
spaces of law and the laws of spaces.  
 David Delaney’s concept of the nomosphere (2010), then, provides a uniquely flexible 
tool for examining how Pacific Park came to be. Motivating Delaney’s coinage of yet another 
neologism in a discipline already crowded with them is what he identifies as an impasse in legal 
geography. The impasse that Delaney describes is characterized by an unbending focus by 
geographers on dualisms inherited from the sub-discipline’s academic lineage, which have not 
yet been shaken loose. In an attempt to move beyond this impasse, Delaney’s nomosphere 
attends to Nicholas Blomley’s call “to find a conceptual language that allows us to think beyond 
binary categories such as ‘space’ and ‘law’ (2003, 17). 
 Hence the nomosphere, which Delaney offers as a framework and tool to take into 
account the multiple legalities, spatialities, and scalar imaginations that constitute the 
experienced, material world. Delaney offers a provisional definition for the nomosphere as “the 
cultural-material envrions that are constituted by the reciprocal materialization of ‘the legal’, and 
the legal signification of the ‘socio-spatial’, and the practical, performative engagements through 
which such constitutive moments happen and unfold” (2010, 25) 
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In constructingt his neologism, Delaney draws first on ‘nomos’, the Greek word for law. 
His interpretation of the law, however, is more than an as-given condition of life. In defending 
his use of ‘law’ to name a concept intended to break free of the law/space dualism, Delaney cites 
Pierre Bourdieu’s argument that the Greek ‘nomos’ can be understood as accounting for “the 
collocation of space-power-meaning” that gives rise to the very idea of law (1986, 437, cited 
Delaney 2010, 25). In the latter half of ‘nomosphere’, Delaney directly draws on the biosphere as 
a neologism that proved valuable in reorganizing contemporary thought. Delaney imagines the 
nomosphere and nomosphericity as flexibly scalar, in the same way that the biosphere as a 
concept can “organize investigations at any scale” (ibid, 24). In the deployment of eminent 
domain for the Atlantic Yards development, this attention to scalar flexibility is especially 
valuable as the project and its resistances confound traditionally hierarchical understandings of 
scale. Nomosphericity offers a language to discuss multiple scalar imaginaries in conflict, 
without foregrounding one or eliding another.  
 In the same way that the biosphere can be used to interrogate the interactions and 
relationships between multiple complex biological systems, the nomosphere can help legal 
geographers examine multiple actors, operating according to different logics, as interrelated. 
Other strands of social theory, including political economy and feminist theory, for example, can 
be woven into a nomospheric investigation to better recognize the socio-spatio-legal 
interrelations governing a fraught development project such as Atlantic Yards.  
Another useful characteristic of the nomosphere is that it does not privilege formal over 
everyday socio-spatio-legal practice. Delaney argues that the legal is just one component of the 
nomosphere, albeit a component institutionalized and given authority by the state (ibid, 28). This 
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structure opens up nomospheric investigations to identify the extra-legal activities of organizers 
opposing the Atlantic Yards project.  
The legal battle surrounding the eminent domain taking of land for the Atlantic Yards 
development can be interpreted as a nomospheric disturbance, a moment when nomospheric 
imaginations collide in disharmony. These disturbances, in turn, became ‘the facts’ of the 
eminent domain challenge’s legal proceedings, which is the subject of this paper. 
Nomosphericity is useful, then, to recognize those facts as only one dimension of a multi-
dimensional conflict. It offers up a tool to escape legal academia and legal geography’s related 
traps of situating the spatial within the legal, and the legal within the spatial, respectively. The 
nomosphere offers up an organizational framework allowing multiple levels of analysis.  
The use of eminent domain to acquire land for the Atlantic Yards project demands an 
interrogation of the political economy of development in New York City. But the goal of this 
thesis is to do more than understand the motivations underlying the eminent domain taking, or 
the judicial logic that allowed it to proceed. In order to interpret the artifacts produced not just in 
but around the eminent domain taking as embodied spatial imaginaries, it is necessary to look 
beyond a pure political economic analysis. 
Conversations that have, at their center, questions about development paradigms have 
overwhelmingly favored political economy analyses. And while critiques of neoliberal 
development offer a great deal to help understand the logics, imaginations, and tools driving 
Pacific Park’s developers, conventional political economy frequently overlooks the ways in 
which everyday life in the city constitutes a site of vast neoliberal restructuring (Kern and 
Mullings, 2013). Feminist political economy is useful, in this sense, as it sublimates into view 
the everyday and the habitual. There is a great deal of alignment between feminist theory and 
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legal geographic theory around the need to focus on how everyday practice normalizes and 
produces invisible systems of control. In this sense, interweaving feminist theory with 
nomosphericity is rather seamless.  
Considering the resistances to the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project, opponents of the 
development enunciate an alternative vision for the site through a variety of mediums. 
Describing the various modes of placemaking in the city, feminist geographer Leslie Kern 
writes, “… a city – its dangers, thrills, culture, attraction, and more – resides in the imagination 
as well as in its material form. The imagined city is shaped by experience, media, art, rumour, 
and our own desires and fears” (2020, 10). Feminist urban theory is valuable here in that, as a 
practice, it lends weight to aspects of daily life that contribute to how cities and places are 
produced and reproduced. The stakes in these struggles over development projects and the 
character of the urban space are high. Kern argues that the materiality of the city influences the 
ways in which social life evolves. The city’s form, she writes, “helps shape the range of 
possibilities for individuals and groups. Their form helps keep some things seeming normal and 
right, and others ‘out of place’ and wrong” (ibid, 14). The struggle over developments like the 
Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project have lasting impacts on the built environment, which in turn 
has lasting impacts on the social life of the city. 
 In theorizing the Atlantic Yards eminent domain taking, how to handle scale? Fixing 
different actors to different positions within a hierarchical network of scalar relations would be 
relatively easy. Community activists were defending their neighborhood, and thusly map onto 
the local. Bruce Ratner and his development firm Forest City Ratner, enabled by city planning 
offices, map easily onto the city. The financiers who initially underwrote the project, and the 
international billionaires who repeatedly bailed the project out of financial crisis map onto the 
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scale of global capital. In almost every case, these obvious scalar associations are echoed in the 
language that each actor or stakeholder deploys in describing their vision of the city. Yet this 
simple hierarchy fails. 
 For one, even if we accepted those hierarchical scalar positions, the consequences of each 
stakeholders’ actions confound those hierarchies. The impacts of decisions by city-wide Public-
Private Partnerships (PPPs) are not evenly distributed across the city’s landscape. To the 
residents living in the project’s footprint, those impacts are intensely local. Similarly, the 
residents’ resistance and opposition to the eminent domain taking stalled the project’s 
development, forcing multiple rounds of financing and refinancing from a suite of foreign 
billionaires (Zirin 2010) and international development corporations. To the developers and 
financiers, the project’s opposition had city-wide, and at points international, consequences.  
 Neil Smith has described this aspect of resistance as “jumping scale”, which he defines as 
the characteristic of being able “to organize the production and reproduction of daily life and to 
resist oppression at a higher scale – over a wider geographical field” (1992, 60). Smith’s 
intervention in rethinking the role and meaning of homeless vehicles provides a useful avenue 
for analyzing the relationship between social processes, their physical embodiments, and the 
often jumbled and tumultuous relationship between those processes and scale. Following this 
intervention, eminent domain can be interpreted as a socio-legal process characterized, in part, 
by its capacity to jump scale as it reorganizes economic and social space. The statute 
simultaneously expedites the transcending of scale in ways which challenge normally held 
relations of power, while simultaneously circumscribing and limiting the reach of resistances to 
spatial reorganization. The statute creates avenues for resistance through which otherwise local 
actors may challenge hegemonic power at the city, state, national, or even global level. 
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Smith’s concept of jumping scale, however, invokes a top-down conceptualization of 
power, itself reliant on a hierarchical imagination of scale. While he allows for disadvantaged 
groups to resist oppression at scales different from their own, the concept reinforces scale and its 
power-relations as hierarchical. To Smith (and to a suite of others in the field, e.g. Harvey, 
Swygdenouw, and Hardt and Negri as well), the global/local binary is constructed such that the 
local is subsumed within the global, subjected inherently to be undermined, appropriated, and 
acted upon by processes of globalization (Gibson-Graham 2002). Feminist theory offers a more 
elegant solution. 
 Feminist critique provides valuable approaches to unfix dialectics that situate local 
resistance within a landscape predetermined to favor city, state, or global power. These analytical 
frameworks are similarly instructive for reinterpreting eminent domain as a scalar process 
without ceding power to global actors at the expense of local stakeholders. J.K. Gibson-Graham 
have posited two strategies for “challenging the power of the global/local binary” (ibid, 30).  
 First, they suggest that deconstruction provides an analytical lens through which the 
binary can be examined and revealed to be incomplete. That within dominant formations of the 
global/local binary, the ‘global’ takes on the master term against which the ‘local’ derives any 
and all meaning, deconstruction reveals that relation to be incomplete. Rereading the global and 
the local as co-productive and concomitant in turn fractures the notion that global power and 
global spaces are hegemonic. Gibson-Graham conclude by suggesting that whether 
deconstructive practice conceives of the global/local binary as an interrogative perspective (e.g., 
Gibson-Graham (2000) or Dirlik (1999)), as one and the same (as does Doreen Massey (1994), 
or as processes (again, Dirlik (1999)), deconstruction largely fails to eradicate the relationship of 
differential power that is given to the global/local dualism. Ultimately Gibson-Graham contend 
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that while deconstruction allows critics to see the global/local binary as incomplete, those same 
critics’ political imaginations may have themselves been globalized, preventing critique from 
escaping the binary frame (2002, 35). 
 Sallie Marston et al. offer a more radical approach to the problem of hierarchical scale in 
their argument for a “flat ontology” (2005). Responding to the trend of complexifying scale by 
incorporating elements of network relation theory, Marston et al. contend that the concept of 
hierarchical scale relies on foundational weaknesses that reform to theory cannot overcome, and 
that hierarchical scale fails to explain a wide swath of socio-territorial relations that exist in 
practice. This case for a flat alternative is particularly compelling in the context of the Atlantic 
Yards – Pacific Park eminent domain taking, in that Marston et al. build on specifically urban 
economic applications of hierarchical scale theorizing (e.g. Neil Smith’s concept of “jumping 
scale” (1992) and Swygdenow’s neologism “glocalization” (1997)). The spatial concepts that we 
receive from scale theorizing ought to be replaced, they argue, with “new spatial concepts that 
linger upon the materialities and singularities of space” (2005, 424). Marston et al. lean on 
Schatzki’s site ontology theory (2002) as the foundations of a flat ontology. They state,  
“a site ontology provides the explanatory power to account for the ways that the layout of 
the built environment – a relatively slow-moving collection of objects – can come to 
function as an ordering force in relation to the practices of humans arranged in 
conjunction with it” (Marston et al. 2005, 425). 
 
Reframing the neighborhood and site of the Atlantic Yards development as a built environment, 
or as a site in these terms, opens new avenues for critique that consider the scalar hierarchies at 
play without necessarily reproducing those hierarchies in practice. 
A key distinction to draw is between theories that destabilize scale and the discursive 
application of scale in the struggle over terrain as seen in the Atlantic Yards-Pacific Park 
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eminent domain taking and the ensuing legal and sociopolitical battle. The difference is between 
scale as ontology and scale as epistemology. Scale as epistemology helps us understand, as 
Katherine Jones frames it, how “participants in political disputes deploy scale discursively, 
alternately representing their position as global or local to enhance their standing” (1998, 27).  
In this light, it can be instructive to understand the resident’s resistance to the eminent 
domain taking as a resistance that discursively seeks to jump scale as a political strategy. While 
the concept reinforces hierarchical scalar imaginaries in problematic ways, it also accurately 
conveys different actors’ self-reflective visions. At the same time, the nomospheric landscape in 
which the eminent domain case plays out demands a more fluid, horizontal, and nuanced 
conceptualization of scale, such as that offered by Sallie Marston and colleagues. Bringing 
feminist critiques of scale into conversation with nomosphericity, the interrogation can proceed 
by understanding that nomospheric disturbances may elucidate the fictitiousness of boundaries 
meant to divide the global and the local and, in so doing, highlight the ways in which the 
local/global binary is fundamentally broken. The eminent domain ruling around the Atlantic 




III. Eminent Domain 
 
Originally a prohibition-era speakeasy on Dean Street and 6th Avenue, Freddy’s Bar has a 
90-plus year history. The bar first served alcohol illicitly, then as a public offering called 
Henderson’s, which catered to the unionized workers at the nearby Spalding Ball factory. The 
name “Freddy’s” was never meant to be permanent, but it stuck after the bar was purchased by 
Freddy Chadderton, a New York Police officer, in the 70s (The Brian Lehrer Show 2010). Over 
time, the bar serviced crowds that ranged from police and firefighters, to groups of anarchist 
activists and local artists. The famous rock band Blue Öyster Cult once performed a late-career 
show there. In part because it was raining that night, and in part because no one believed such a 
famous band would play such a tiny venue, the show was only sparsely attended (Fahim 2010). 
The bar closed for business in spring 2010; it fell in the Atlantic Yards project’s footprint. After 
years of legal struggle, Freddy’s – along with a number of other properties – was seized through 
the deployment of eminent domain powers by the Empire State Development Corporation 
(ESDC). The property was handed over to developer Forest City Ratner, which promptly 
demolished the bar. 
In order to move forward with the Atlantic Yards project, development firm Forest City 
Ratner (FCR) had to acquire the land upon which it intended to build. While many real estate 
owners willfully sold their properties and land to FCR, not all businesses and landlords were 
compliant. Across residents, the decision not to sell to FCR were informed by a wide range of 
beliefs, ranging from the inability to negotiate a mutually satisfactory price for the property, to 
an unwillingness to part with one’s property due to unquantifiable motivations, such as nostalgia 
and sentimentality (as was the case with Freddy’s). Fortunately for FCR, and to the chagrin of 
the land owners and tenants who did not want to sell, recent shifts in the deployment of eminent 
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domain powers enabled the firm, with advisement and support from a number of governmental 
agencies, to take the land. Unsurprisingly, this exercise of eminent domain powers sparked a 
drawn out legal battle that proceeded through the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court 
in the state. 
From a legal perspective, eminent domain can be considered in two ways. First, it is a 
constitutional power granted to the state. Different jurisdictions at different scales (e.g., federal 
or state) might be constitutionally empowered to deploy eminent domain. Second, it is a process 
that is delineated through procedural law. The distinction is that the first framing defines the 
right of the federal government or of states to seize private property for public use, and the 
second framing defines for each jurisdiction how that seizure can occur.  
The power of eminent domain is first and foremost drawn directly from the final clause 
of the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment. In its entirety, the Fifth Amendment reads: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. (US Const. amend. V) 
 
Broadly speaking, the amendment outlines a number of legal rights due to individuals during 
legal proceedings. The earlier clauses describe an individual’s right to a grand jury for criminal 
proceedings, to immunity from double jeopardy, to not be compelled to self-incriminate in court, 
and to due process. It is from the final clause, reading “…  nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation” (ibid), that national eminent domain powers (and the 
inherited state eminent domain powers reproduced in state constitutions), are derived. And while 
the Fifth Amendment establishes national eminent domain powers, it also establishes two 
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constitutional preconditions that must be met for public seizure to take place. First, that the 
taking of private property must be for public use, and second, that the owner of the private 
property must be justly compensated.  
   The first precondition does more than provide protection to property owners, however. 
While it limits takings to those that will be applied towards a public use, it also tacitly implies 
that the power by the state to take land is a preexisting right of the state; it does not grant a new 
right to the government (United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946)). The underlying notion 
– that the right to take land for public use is a sovereign right of a government, gives rise to 
eminent domain powers held by states in addition to those held by the federal government. And 
while any taking must be for public use, the definition of public use has proved elusive. In 1930, 
the United States Supreme Court confirmed that the power to determine whether or not a taking 
is for public use lies in the judiciary (Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 444 (1930)). But in a 
1954 refusal to define public use, the court constrained its own powers, ruling that the court’s 
capacity to determine whether or not a taking is for public use is, in fact, extremely narrow 
(Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). Ultimately, the public use clause of the Fifth 
Amendment evokes two major questions, both of which the judiciary has declined to give 
decisive or lasting ruling towards. First, what constitutes the public? Does it comprise the 
residents of a place? Or does it refer to space regardless of who or what is there? And second, 
what is in the public’s interest? The latter question is clearly contingent on the first. 
 At least in general terms, the functioning of the court is to resolve legal disputes and, in 
so doing, to clarify ambiguities that exist in the law. As legal interpretations undergo increasing 
clarification, precedent is set which determines how lower courts and the states’ police powers 
enforce the law, thereby constituting legal practice. It is often remarked that legal practice is 
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differentially exercised across people and place. But broad constitutional interpretations that set 
the framework for legal practice are, themselves, often in flux. The court reverses rulings, sets 
new precedent, limits its own power to interpret, and then broadens those powers on a regular 
basis. Legal practice is not only differentially exercised across space, then, but across time as 
well. Regarding eminent domain powers, the interpretation of the public use clause has shifted 
with the needs and demands of different political moments.  
 There exists in the popular conception of eminent domain case law the notion that the 
Supreme Court ruling in Kelo v. New London (545 U.S. 469 (2005)) constituted a sea-change in 
how eminent domain is handled and justified. Critics of the ruling suggested that Kelo would 
usher in an era of unprecedented land-takings through the exercise of eminent domain, hinging 
on the use of economic development to satisfy the public use requirement. In fact, the economic 
development argument had been utilized for decades. Kelo was notable not for the logic 
undergirding the state’s taking of land, but for the public backlash against the ruling (Kim 2009).  
 In Kelo, the City of New London, Connecticut, intended to use eminent domain to 
assemble a parcel of land that could be converted into a business district. The use of eminent 
domain was critical to a broader development plan approved by the city, which sought to create 
over 1,000 new jobs, and to increase tax revenue leading to the revitalization of the city’s 
downtown and waterfront districts (Kelo, 268 Conn. 1 (2004)). New London was a city in fiscal 
distress. The 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, a federally owned submarine 
manufactory, gutted the city’s economy. At the time of the proposed plan, the city’s 
unemployment rate was twice that of the rest of Connecticut, and its population was at its lowest 
point since 1920 (545 U.S. 469 (2005)). Under these conditions, the New London Development 
Corporation (NLDC), a public-private partnership whose goal was to return the city to economic 
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viability, was established. The NLDC negotiated terms with pharmaceutical company Pfizer, and 
put together a plan to convert considerable land within the city into an industrial park, wherein 
Pfizer would build a research facility. The city authorized the NLDC as its agent to purchase 
those parcels necessary for the development, and empowered the NLDC to use eminent domain 
where negotiations with private property owners failed.  
 The challenge to the eminent domain takings quickly escalated from New London 
Superior Court to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which affirmed the seizure in 2004. The 
United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiori (i.e., agreed to hear the case) to an 
appeal of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision. At particular stake in the Supreme Court 
setting was the question as to whether or not eminent domain could be used to transfer property 
from one private owner (e.g., Susette Kelo, the plaintiff) to another (e.g., the Pfizer 
pharmaceutical company), and whether the public use clause could be satisfied in that context. 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NLDC, again affirming the seizure. In the majority 
opinion, Justice Stevens summarizes the dilemma and the unique nature of Kelo: 
“Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted 
that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to 
another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is 
equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future 
“use by the public” is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad 
with common-carrier duties is a familiar example. Neither of these propositions, 
however, determines the disposition of this case.” (545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005)). 
 
Regarding the first proposition, the majority held that such a transference would indeed be 
unconstitutional if the benefit of ownership was exclusive to the receiving party. To this end, the 
court referenced its ruling in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, that “a purely private taking 
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate 
purpose of government and would thus be void” (467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).  
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 The court then determines that the interpretation of ‘public use’ need not directly map 
onto the notion of ‘use by the public’. In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens holds that the ‘use 
by the public’ standard is inadequate, as it is hard to administer, and that its meaning changes 
over time with the demands of society. The majority decision ultimately maintained the court’s 
position that ‘public use’ can be interpreted as ‘public purpose’. And the responsibility to define 
public purpose, they contend, lies in the legislature and not the judiciary.  
 The court’s ruling, that the use of eminent domain to transfer property from one private 
owner to another is constitutional, given the expectation that the receiving owner would generate 
economic growth and with the concession that such growth constitutes a public purpose, is 
critically important to the Atlantic Yards seizure. Kelo was decided six to three, with Chief 
Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissenting. 
Justice O’Connor penned the dissenting opinion, which began by referencing the decision in 
Calder v. Bull, that any ruling which takes property from private owner A and confers it upon 
private owner B is “against all reason and justice” (3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798)). In the dissent to 
Kelo, O’Connor contends that the court cedes that basic limitation on government power. As she 
sees it, the court’s ruling in Kelo makes all private property vulnerable to takings under the guise 
of economic development, and erases the boundaries separating public and private property (545 
U.S. 469 (2005)). 
 Despite the fact that the decision in Kelo seems to elevate the rights of the business-
owning class over those of private citizens, the division in the court points to another 
interpretation. Of the three dissenting Justices, O’Connor – a staunch centrist – is by far the most 
liberal. Justices Scalia and Thomas, who ranked in that court as the most conservative Justices by 
far, joined O’Connor in her dissent. If Kelo was a decision in favor of business interests, and at 
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an historic moment typified by rampant neoliberalism, what explains the conservative dissent? 
How to reconcile the Justice’s well-established positions on the political spectrum with their 
seemingly-contradictory opinion in Kelo?  
Despite the material effects of the ruling, Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas base 
their dissent on a political philosophy that valorizes private property ownership and individual 
liberties above all else. Eminent domain, as they see it, is an incursion on the right to hold and 
use private property. Conversely, the majority ruling in Kelo undermines, at least to some degree, 
the sanctity of private property ownership. Kelo only goes so far, however. Upholding Kelo as a 
hallmark decision against the tendency to lionize private property would miss an essential point.  
While the decision expanded the public use clause’s interpretation, it did not do so in a 
way that necessarily makes public use more accessible. The use of eminent domain in Kelo, or in 
the Atlantic Yards project, does not yield an urban commons where before there was only private 
property. The right of the state to take private property and convert it to a commons – say, a park 
– already existed. And while the historical use of eminent domain takings even in those contexts 
is fraught with private interests, the jump from urban commons to public use is not so hard to 
conceive. Rather, the decision in Kelo expanded the definition of ‘public use’ to include 
economic benefits generated from private use by private property owners, in this case those 
representing the corporatist class. 
 In turn, the central argument around eminent domain made in this paper – that it ought to 
be reconceptualized as a socio-legal and socio-spatial process – is not an argument for or against 
the statute or its deployment. Endorsing the wholesale use of eminent domain to establish urban 
commons would need to reconcile an idealized vision of the future with the statute’s legacy and 
material effects. Conversely, staunch opposition to eminent domain would fall in line with 
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Scalia’, Thomas’, and O’Connor’s political philosophy which elevates private property 
ownership over all other types of land use. Reimagining eminent domain as a process leaves 
political analysis open to individual cases, allowing a more nuanced interpretation of the public 
seizure in the Atlantic Yards project. 
The use of eminent domain to take land for Ratner’s Atlantic Yards project, in the context 
of New York City development, was by no means novel. Eminent domain played – and 
continues to play – a prominent role in the making, shaping, and design of New York City’s 
landscape. The historical frame of New York’s most drastic reshaping is typically associated 
with the ascendancy of Robert Moses from civil servant to master architect. Moses, who served 
as a city planner from the 1920s through the 1960s, deployed eminent domain broadly to rebuild 
the city according to his grand, massively scaled, Haussmann-esque vision. Public accounts of 
Moses’ vision and methods frequently lionize him, even as the urban planning literature has been 
largely critical of his work. The recent commonly held conceptions of Moses border the divine: 
at the centennial of his birth, the Long Island Monthly ran a three-page spread of his work titled 
“Wholly Moses!”, and credited him with “almost single-handedly ‘creat[ing]’ Long Island” 
(Wallock 1991, 340). The fact that Long Island predates Moses by roughly 21,000 years doesn’t 
seem to outweigh the gravity his works bear in the popularly held imagination of how New York 
came to be. 
In fact, the deification of Moses at the hand of New York City’s middle-class is 
staggeringly revisionist. Despite his enormous impact on the built environment, his career as a 
planner was marked as much by failure as by success. His failed projects, however, have 
sublimated away. In his dressing-down of Moses’ legacy, Leonard Wallock enumerates Moses’ 
grand projects that never came to fruition, including “efforts to construct a Brooklyn-Batter 
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Bridge, build a Lower and a Mid-Manhattan expressway, control the city’s airports, block the 
Port Authority’s bus terminal, and erect a Rye-Oyster Bay bridge” (ibid, 345). In The 
Assassination of New York, Robert Fitch makes the case that Moses’ political clout and public 
face allowed him to serve as the Jewish “scapegoat” for the land-holding, goyish “barons” who 
sought to profit off the continual redevelopment of New York City (Fitch 1993, 82). Whether or 
not Moses’ planning vision took cues from the ultra-rich interests of the Regional Plan 
Association, the legacy of his methods hold sway. Robert Moses used eminent domain to cleave 
neighborhoods, to displace the poverty-affected cores that had been hollowed out by post-
industrialism, and to build in their place massive parks and infrastructure projects.  
Outside of Moses’ large-scale projects, perhaps the most iconic example of eminent 
domain in New York’s history is in the targeted reconstruction, redevelopment, and rebranding 
of Times Square. Following in Moses’ model, the Times Square redevelopment project 
constituted an amalgamation of public-private partnerships and development corporations, most 
notably the Urban Development Corporation (UDC)2. In their defense of the use of eminent 
domain to take the land for the Times Square redevelopment, the UDC constructs a moral 
hierarchy that elevates the future commercial possibility of a redeveloped Times Square over the 
site’s reality as of 1984:  
"Whereas, The Project Area is marked by street crime, substandard and insanitary (sic) 
conditions, uses that inhibit the general public’s use and enjoyment of the Project Area, 
and physical, economic and social blight which contribute to the growth of crime and 
delinquency and impair the sound growth and development of the Project Area and of the 
City as a whole; and. . . Whereas, The redevelopment of the Project Area is in the best 
interest of the City in that it will remove blight and physical, economic and social decay 
and replace them with a variety of new uses which will result in commercial and 
 
2 This method of nesting development interests in a complex web of development corporations, 
organizations, and private interests – which was undoubtedly a major contribution of Moses’ to 




economic expansion, cultural and entertainment rejuvenation and improved public 
services and facilities, to the betterment of the Project Area in particular and the City in 
general. . .” (New York City Board of Estimates 1984, p.1 and Miller 2002) 
 
Kristine Miller points to two noteworthy aspects of the above justification. First, that the blight 
argument – a legal justification for the seizure of land through eminent domain – by necessity 
moralizes land use in a way that promotes commercial productivity above all else. And second, 
that in public descriptions of eminent domain takings, and in the case law of eminent domain 
proceedings, the land that is to be taken is always labeled a ‘project area’, and never a 
‘neighborhood’. This is both significant and politically expedient; “the term neighborhood”, she 
writes, “implies complex relationships among people and physical locations over time”, while 
the term “project area implies a bounded geographic location on which a predetermined program 
will take physical form” (Miller 2002, 140). This way of ordering space and time as a 
mechanism for value accretion is further explained in Rachel Weber’s 2016 work describing the 
performative nature of property cycles. Weber argues that the application of market narratives to 
space serves to obfuscate the institutions and human interests that actually create change and to 
“position market activity as operating on autopilot, removed from social interests, financial 
incentives, or political pressures” (2016, 592). Recognizing a place as a neighborhood rather than 
a project area implicitly cedes the understanding that it is a place rich with complex social 
networks. A neighborhood being subject to eminent domain takings is twice obliterated: its 
erasure is first linguistic, then material.   
As discussed previously, while the power of eminent domain is codified in the United 
States’ constitution, the language with which it is established extends the power to individual 
states. Through procedural law, states define the process through which the power of eminent 
domain can be exercised. In New York, those rules are laid out in the New York Consolidated 
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Laws Eminent Domain Procedure, or EDP. The law’s first article establishes six objectives 
driving the codification of eminent domain in state law: to establish the only legal procedures 
under which property may be condemned; to ensure that just compensation is paid to property 
owners whose property is being condemned; to mandate opportunities for the public to 
participate in the planning process of eminent domain projects; to require that projects be in the 
public interest, as well as in the interest of private property owners; to expedite the payment of 
compensation to property owners; and to encourage settlement and reduce litigation (NY Em 
Dom Pro L § 101 (2012)).  
Of the six objectives, two are procedural (the first and third), and one emphasizes the 
necessity that a taking be in the public interest (the fourth). The remaining three center the 
importance of just compensation to property owners, create avenues to expedite payment to 
property owners, and justify legally established incentives for property owners to not seek legal 
recourse.  It could be argued that the third clause, which is listed above as procedural, in fact 
centers the public interest by offering public participation as an avenue through which public 
interest might be enunciated. Even if that were the case, though, it is clear in the history of the 
Atlantic Yards development, and in many other eminent domain takings, that such a goal is 
easily circumvented through complex networks of local benefit corporations, private-public 
partnerships, and quasi-municipal bodies that represent project stakeholders while purporting to 
be communitarian.  
The point here being that the EDP is concerned primarily with the efficacious transfer of 
private property, and that the public interest is a secondary consideration. Towards that end, the 
law uses an extraordinarily circular definition of ‘public project’, as “any program or project for 
which acquisition of property may be required for a public use, benefit or purpose” (ibid, § 103 
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(2012)). The law does not define ‘public’, ‘public use’, ‘public benefit’ or ‘public purpose’. As 
Kristine Miller notes in her review of the Times Square taking, this broad definition confers 
substantial autonomy to local legislatures in how, where, and to what end eminent domain may 
be leveraged (Miller 2002, 140).  
Even while offering wide latitude to project developers, the law establishes avenues 
through which condemnees may voice their opposition to a taking. The process through which 
condemnees can contest the taking of their property, what arguments are accepted on their 
behalf, and what constitutes evidence to their case is delimited in the statute. Thusly, in the same 
maneuver that the law confers a legitimate means of resistance to eminent domain condemnees, 
it simultaneously circumscribes the character of that resistance.  
Rules for petitioning against an eminent domain taking in New York, where the Atlantic 
Yards project stands, are outlined in Article two, section seven of the New York eminent domain 
statute. The statute establishes four conditions which may be reviewed by the courts pursuant to 
a condemnees petition against an eminent domain taking. Those conditions are, first, that “the 
proceeding was in conformity with the federal and state constitutions”; second, that “the 
proposed acquisition is within the condemner’s statutory jurisdiction or authority”; third, the 
court may rule as to whether or not “the condemner’s determination and findings were made in 
accordance with procedures set forth in this article” and in accordance with the environmental 
conservation regulations established in article eight; and fourth, if “a public use, benefit or 
purpose will be served by the proposed acquisition” (NY Em Dom Pro L § 207 (2012)). Three of 
the four grounds upon which a court might reverse an eminent domain taking are procedural. In 
other words, they do not take into account the facts of the circumstance so much as they take into 
account the processes through which those facts are presented and the acquisition occurs. 
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Because eminent domain takings are performed by the state itself (or, more commonly, 
by a quasi-state actor imbued with the power of eminent domain by the state), the resources 
necessary to navigate the procedural landscape defining the statute are stacked very much in the 
condemner’s favor. If staffs of legal experts and connections to the different arms of the state 
were not resources enough, there is something also to be said for experience. Frequently, the 
developers who rely on eminent domain to subsidize their work are frequent users. For Bruce 
Ratner, CEO of the Atlantic Yards developer at the time of its eminent domain taking, eminent 
domain was far from foreign terrain. Ratner benefited from eminent domain in the taking of 123 
parcels of land for the Metrotech development in downtown Brooklyn (Friedlander 2005). In 
fact, when plans to found a new Business Improvement District (BID)3 for the Atlantic Yards 
project fell through in 2013, FCR instead chose to simply expand the Metrotech BID, run by the 
Downtown Brooklyn Partnership, to cover a section of the project footprint including FCR’s 
Atlantic Mall (Oder 2015). 
Experience, however, is not a resource available to condemnees. A property owner would 
consider themselves exceedingly unlucky to receive notice of condemnification more than once. 
As discussed above, the EDP delineates the forms of legitimate protest against an eminent 
domain taking, and those forms of legitimate protest are largely procedural. That is to say, the 
most likely avenue of recourse for an individual or business with property being targeted for 
public seizure is to challenge the condemner’s adherence to the process. And while condemnees 
are best-situated to argue against a taking on the grounds of public use – themselves being the 
 
3 One of a whole slew of public-private partnerships forming the complex network that facilitate 
eminent domain takings for developers, even as it muddies the water for public scrutiny. Other 
examples are Economic Development Councils (EDCs) and Public Benefit Agreements (PBAs). 
Community boards, which actually represent the public and provide a forum for community 
voices, do not have a say in eminent domain proceedings. 
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constituents of the public – that is in fact a small corner of the area demarcated for legitimate 
protest. It is outside of that boundary, in the realm of legally illegitimate protest, that much of the 
social organizing and movement-building work against neoliberal redevelopment takes place. 
Ironically, it is in spaces of illegitimate protest, where neighbors find common ground, share 
space and food, create protest art together, and uplift one another’s narratives of struggle, that a 
sense of community and neighborhood is most strongly crystallized. Nonetheless art, communal 
spaces, and neighborly ties do not constitute evidence against a taking according to the eminent 
domain statute. Consequently, neighborhoods struggle to seek out legal support – often pro bono 
– to help navigate the unfamiliar terrain of legitimized procedural protest.  
Ultimately the state’s power to seize private property for public use is an extremely broad 
one. While the procedural requirements of eminent domain takings provide some recourse to 
condemnees, the primary venue for that resistance is to challenge the process and not the intent. 
The result is a conflict stacked in the condemner’s favor. As described above, eminent domain 
case law coming out of the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded the definition of ‘public use’ to 
include the economic benefits that might be conferred by transferring property from one private 
owner to another. Public use, in this sense, can map neatly onto the amount of value that can be 
extracted from a land resource. The result of this broadened definition is that, when a property is 
not being utilized to its maximum economic potential, it may be subject to public seizure and 
transferred to another private owner that could extract greater value. Potential condemners or 
private recipients of a public seizure asset can leverage this definition alongside expertise in 
procedural law to stack the deck heavily in their own favor. As I will show in the next chapter, 





IV: What Happened, and When 
 
 In order to understand how the textual artifacts produced through legal struggle over the 
Atlantic Yards project came to be, it is necessary to establish what happened, and when. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a rough timeline of the development process, highlighting 
moments that became critical to the ensuing legal battle. Because the opposition to the project 
was largely reactive, this chapter tends to give more weight to the developer’s actions. This is not 
to suggest that the broad-based opposition to the project was passive during the Atlantic Yard’s 
early- and middle-years. The opposition’s work, and a conversation on how their tactics and 
legal artifacts can be interpreted as embodied spatial imaginaries, comes later. Furthermore, this 
timeline begins in 2003, but there is a case to be made that this project’s timeline extends at least 
as far back as the middle of the 20th century. Nonetheless, the conversation picks up in the early 
2000s, before official plans were announced.  
Rumors that developer Bruce Ratner was in conversations with the owners of the New 
Jersey Nets NBA team began in the summer of 2003. The first official word came not long after, 
in August 2003, when Charles Bagli of the New York Times reported on plans for Ratner to 
purchase the Nets and move them to a new stadium in Brooklyn. The stadium was to be designed 
by famed architect Frank Gehry, who designed the Guggenheim museum’s Bilbao location. As 
reported, Ratner asked New York City officials to develop a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) “expressing public support for the multibillion-dollar project” (Bagli 2003a). According 
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to Bagli, the plan at the time also included moving the New Jersey Devils, a National Hockey 
League franchise, to the stadium as well4.  
 By December of 2003, details of the project started to come to light. With the sale of the 
New Jersey Nets still up in the air, the project was presented in as rosy a light as possible, so as 
to best woo the team’s then-owners and prospective sellers. The project, Forest City Ratner 
claimed, would cost two and a half billion dollars. It would entail refurbishing the Vanderbilt 
Yards facility owned by the Long Island Rail Road. The stadium itself – which would seat 
19,000 and the roof of which would be a public park with a running track – would cost $435 
million. (Bagli 2003b). Frank Gehry described the future stadium as “sheathed in glass”, so as to 
be visibly penetrable to passers-by, which they suggested would better incorporate the stadium 
into the neighborhood (ibid). During a presentation to Mayor Bloomberg and major potential 
investors, Bruce Ratner claimed that the project would not be “economically viable without a 
real estate component”, and so the project would also entail the construction of four towers and 
4,500 apartments. Ratner requested that the Metropolitan Transit Authority cede some of its land 
to his project, and asked that the city condemn the remainder of the footprint under eminent 
domain. Most importantly, as Charles Bagli of the New York Times5 reports, Ratner suggested 
that the project would be almost entirely privately financed (ibid).  
 
4 This plan almost reached a bizarre, zombified fruition in 2015 when new owners moved the 
New York Islanders (another NHL franchise, although much less valuable than the Devils) to the 
Barclays Center. The team struggled to draw crowds to the stadium, which was never designed 
for hockey in the first place (Bondy 2017). Since then, the Barclays management has reported 
that they could make more money hosting concerts and other events over the hockey team. The 
team’s ownership is now looking into building a new stadium near Citi Field in Queens, New 
York, or moving the team to Hartford, Connecticut (Soshnick 2017). 
 




 In under two months, Ratner had been approved to purchase the New Jersey Nets, and 
did so for $300 million. Though the team could not be moved to Brooklyn until 2008, when their 
lease at their New Jersey stadium was set to expire, the acquisition was a linchpin necessary to 
move his plan forward (Sandomir and Bagli 2004). The following spring, FCR commissioned 
sports economist Andrew Zimbalist to conduct an analysis on their plan’s projected economic 
impact. Zimbalist’s report acknowledges that the overwhelming literature on stadium-centered 
development suggests that municipalities “should not anticipate a positive economic or fiscal 
impact from a new sports facility” (Zimbalist 2004, 1). He then goes on to describe how he 
believes the project will be an exception, and that the city and state can expect tax revenues of 
$4.1 billion (ibid, 29). Zimbalist, it should be noted, does not have expertise in the area of his 
report. While he has written extensively about arena and stadium projects – and often comes out 
against them – the Atlantic Yards project only includes a stadium in what is, more broadly, an 
urban redevelopment project with the housing market and not the sports market at its core. 
 In March of 2004 an opposition group – Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn (DDDB) – 
formed. DDDB served as the primary microphone for tenants, owners, and community members 
who opposed the Ratner project. In their critique, DDDB centers the abuse of eminent domain, 
specifically the transference of property to a private entity for a private (not public) benefit. 
 About a year later, after FCR acquired some properties in the footprint on the open 
market, Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) issued a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) produced with FCR regarding the construction of 
affordable housing in the project’s real-estate component. The agreement in the MOU stated, 
pending the project’s approval by a slew of city and state agencies, that ACORN would assist in 
developing half of the 4,500 planned residential units as affordable housing. The MOU’s first 
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agreement clause specifies 2,250 affordable units; it’s second clause specifies that ACORN must 
publicly endorse and support the project (Atlantic Yards and ACORN, 2005). Put differently, 
FCR promised affordable housing set-asides in order to buy a publicity campaign with a 
seemingly community-driven organization. The ACORN MOU marks the beginning of a 
campaign by the developers promoting the public benefits to be delivered by the project, not just 
in its completion but throughout the development and construction process. This campaign 
played an integral component in FCR’s attempts to expedite the transference of the Vanderbilt 
Rail Yards and a number of other Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) properties to the 
developer.  
Setting aside the fact that affordable housing units, as calculated by percentage of area 
median income in New York City are ‘affordable’ in name only, the 50% goal is a noble one. It 
enticed ACORN, and prompted a flurry of articles and announcements extolling the project. 
Nine days after the ACORN MOU was announced, FCR submitted a revised plan for the 
Atlantic Yards project to the New York City Committee on Economic Development. The plan 
expanded the total number of residential units within the plan to 6,000, and with room to move 
up to 7,300. The number of affordable units remained unchanged from the 2,250 in the ACORN 
MOU. In just under two weeks, the share of affordable housing in the project dropped from 50% 
to about 30% (Independent Budget Office 2005).  
The campaign to improve the public image, and the image of public benefit, continued 
through the summer of 2005, when FCR developed the first Community Benefits Agreement 
(CBA) in New York history. CBAs are agreements between real estate developers and 
community groups that guarantee some public benefits to be delivered by the project. In 
exchange, the community groups are required to publicly support the project, and are barred 
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from speaking out in opposition. In essence, CBAs resemble the MOU that FCR entered into 
with ACORN, but carry more authority in how they limit public engagement.  
Eight groups signed the CBA, including ACORN. The others include Brooklyn United 
for Innovative Local Development (BUILD), First Atlantic Terminal Housing Committee 
(FATHC), and Public Housing Communities, all housing-oriented organizations; neighborhood 
development group Downtown Brooklyn Neighborhood Alliance (DBNA); professional group 
New York State Association of Minority Contractors (NYSAMC); and educational group 
Downtown Brooklyn Educational Consortium (DBEC). The last, and by far most interesting 
signatory, is the All-Faith Council of Brooklyn (AFCB). Regarding AFCB, the CBA reads: 
“AFCB will form and facilitate an All-Faith Council, which shall be representative of the 
religious diversity within the Community, to establish an ongoing mechanism for community 
input for referrals to the jobs, housing and other programs created by this Agreement” (FCR et 
al. 2005). The sentence reads as if the verb “form” in “AFCB will form and facilitate” refers to 
the following subject, “an All-Faith Council”. As it turns out, it also refers to the object, AFCB 
itself. The organization did not exist before the document, and the cast of characters listed as 
heads of the organization changed in every succeeding iteration (Oder 2008a). 
At the time that the CBA was signed, the rights to the railyards had not yet been sold. The 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority had issued a public request for proposals for developers 
to bid on the Vanderbilt Yards rehabilitation project. According to the original plan, FCR was 
offered $50 million for the rights to the railyards. In July of 2005, after being prompted by the 
community advocacy group DDDB, the developer Extell released a counter-bid for the railyards 
at $150 million, three times the FCR bid (Extell 2005). Compared to Ratners bid which, at the 
time, included a $3.5 billion tower complex alongside the Nets arena and the 6,000 (or 7,000ish) 
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residential apartments, the Extell design’s total cost was $1 billion, and included 2,000 
apartments. Extell CEO Gary Barnett, however, vowed to not use eminent domain in his 
proposal, and the Extell plan only included developing over the railyards (Bagli 2005a). An 
appraisal by the MTA put the value of the railyard development rights at around $250 million, 
considerably more than either the Extell or FCR offers.  
In response to the Extell offer, FCR raised their bid to $100 million (Bagli 2005b); twice 
their original offer, but still only two thirds of Extell’s and less than half of the MTA’s appraisal. 
About a week later, on September 14, 2005, the MTA agreed to sell the railyards development 
rights to FCR for $100 million, undercutting both their own valuation and the Extell bid. When 
Peter Kalikow, then the acting chairman of the MTA, was criticized for selling the development 
rights for less than their appraised value, he dismissed his own organization’s appraisal. The 
$214.5 million value that the MTA arrived at was, he claimed “just some guy’s idea of what it’s 
worth”. He argued that the MTA’s appraisal mustn’t be legitimate because neither of the 
development bids approached the $214.5 million figure (Bernstein 2005). Basically, the MTA 
argued that because they were accepting a lower offer, that their own appraisal must be wrong. 
Having won the bid for the railyards development, and having already acquired through 
the open market many of the properties necessary for the broader development project, FCR still 
had a number of bureaucratic hurdles to clear before groundbreaking could happen. Setting aside 
the acquisition of land through eminent domain, FCR had to pass an environmental review and 
receive approval from a number of state agencies. FCR, in order to be in compliance with the 
State of New York’s Environmental Quality Review (EQR) process, had to produce a Draft 
Environmental Impact Scope (DEIS). The purpose of the DEIS is to outline all the aspects of the 
project impacts that they intend to analyze, as well as the methods they would deploy in that 
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process. FCR published an initial Draft Scope of Analysis in September 2005. After a public 
hearing with several hundred community members in attendance, and having received comments 
from several community boards and the Council of Brooklyn Neighborhoods, FCR released a 
revised Final Scope of Analysis in March 2006. When the project was announced in 2003, FCR 
suggested a 10-year timeframe to completion. In the Final Scope presented on March 31st, 2006, 
completion of the project’s first phase was pushed to 2010, and the second phase to 2016 (ESDC 
2006a). Before construction started, the project was behind schedule. 
The Final Scope also states the purpose of the project and, in doing so, sets up the 
justification for an eminent domain taking. The Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC), 
which authored the Final Scope and serves as a primary public partner for Ratner’s project, 
claims that “[t]he overarching goal of the proposed project is to transform an area that is blighted 
and largely underutilized into a vibrant mixed-use community” (ESDC 2006a, 7). ‘Blight’ has 
been a long-accepted, and just as long ill-defined, rationale for condemnification under eminent 
domain. The reasoning that is actually used is more circular than the Final Scope’s language 
would suggest. The area is not “blighted and largely underutilized”6, as written. Rather, 
underutilization is itself one of the primary metrics used by FCR and ESDC to characterize 
blight.  
In the fall of 2006, DDDB expanded its opposition to the project from the streets to the 
court. After FCR spent the spring and summer promoting the project and raising capital, DDDB 
hosted its second annual walkathon, raising over $100,000 to support legal fees for the pending 
eminent domain case (Oder 2006). On October 26, 2006, tenants and business owners whose 
properties would be condemned filed a lawsuit challenging the eminent domain taking. Daniel 
 
6 Emphasis added. 
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Goldstein, a tenant in a to-be-condemned building and one of the project’s loudest critics, served 
as lead plaintiff in the suit Goldstein v. Pataki in the Eastern District of New York (EDNY). The 
lawsuit is field against New York Governor Pataki, alongside a host of public-private partnership 
organizations, developers, and businesses, including Bruce Ratner himself, Forest City Ratner 
Companies, Forest City Enterprises, Ratner Group, New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg, 
the Urban Development Corporation, and several others (Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F.Supp.2d 254 
(2007)). Judge Robert M. Levy served as magistrate judge on the case (handling discovery and 
pre-trial motions), with Judge Nicholas Garaufis presiding. 
Proceedings begin in early 2007, with all of the defendants moving to have the complaint 
dismissed. Magistrate Judge Levy, in his recommendation to Judge Garaufis, recommends that 
the defendants’ request for dismissal be granted (ibid, 256). The defendants’ request was based 
on the argument that the case was not ripe, and that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. Ripeness, in this context refers to a complaint that is 
contingent on future events that may or may not unfold as anticipated. In other words, the 
defendants claimed that the complaint against an eminent domain taking was not ripe for judicial 
review because the condemnation proceedings had not, at that point, already begun. Further, the 
challenge to whether the taking was for public use could not be argued because the actual 
outcomes of the development were not yet known. Governor Pataki also invoked qualified 
immunity to extricate himself from legal embroilment. Magistrate Judge Levy recommended that 
the complaint be dismissed on Burford exemption grounds. In Burford v. Sun Oil Company (319 
U.S. 315 (1943)), the U.S. Supreme Court elected to not intervene in a case due to the 
disruptions that federal judicial intervention would cause in a complex network of municipal 
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actors and legislative bodies. The defendants in Goldstein v. Pataki claimed that they constituted 
such a complex, interwoven network.  
Regarding Levy’s recommendations, Judge Garaufis writes that he “accepts and adopts 
those recommendations in part, rejects those recommendations in part, and dismisses this 
consolidated case in its entirety”7 (Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007)), effectively ruling in favor of the developers. Regarding the plaintiffs’ challenge to the 
public benefit of the eminent domain taking, Judge Garaufis echoes the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
position that it is not up the court to decide what constitutes a public benefit. The decision states 
that whether the project’s outcomes constitute a public benefit “may be an important political 
question, and if the citizens of Brooklyn are unsatisfied with the answers, then elected officials 
may pay the price at the polls” (ibid, 287). In other words, that is a legislative and not a judicial 
determination. The plaintiffs did not deny that the sports arena or housing would be built. Judge 
Garaufis dismissed the public use complaint, writing that the plaintiff’s allegations concern “only 
the measure of a public benefit … as opposed to its existence” (ibid, 287). The extent to which 
the project might benefit the community was not up for consideration.  
On July 31, 2007, the plaintiffs filed an appeal brief in the United States 2nd Circuit Court 
of Appeals to have Judge Garaufis’ decision overturned. The appeal again centers on the public 
use clause of the eminent domain statute. The brief challenges the extent to which the project 
serves a public purpose, and the notion that community input was taken into account in the 
project’s design. Oral arguments took place in October of 2007 before Chief Judge Jacobs and 
Circuit Judges Katzmann and Livingston. The appellate court denied the plaintiff’s their appeal 
 
7 The case was consolidated with another, Piller v. Pataki – wherein another condemnee in the 
Atlantic Yards project footprint sued Governor Pataki, state agencies, and the developers. 
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in a ruling issued in early February, 2008. In their decision, the appellate judges write that “[a]t 
the end of the day, we are left with the distinct impression that the lawsuit is animated by 
concerns about the wisdom of the Atlantic Yards Project and its effect on the community”, and 
that while the judges recognize the concern of the property owners, “such matters of policy are 
the province of the elected branches, not this Court” (Goldstien v. Pataki, 517 F.3d 50, 65 (2nd 
Cir. 2008)).  
Construction had been largely delayed through legal action up to the 2nd Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ ruling in early 2008, and little progress took place after the 2nd Circuit’s decision as the 
developers managed small changes in the project plan. In June of 2008, the United States 
Supreme Court denied to grant certiorari to the Atlantic Yards eminent domain case (although 
Justice Alito noted that he wanted to review the Second Circuit’s decision). The Supreme 
Court’s denial effectively ended any opportunities for opposition to the project in federal court. 
The plaintiff’s lawyer, Matthew Brinckherhoff, stated that the petitioners would be filing another 
lawsuit against the developers in New York State court (Chan 2008). 
In September of 2008 the subprime mortgage crisis spilled over into the investment 
banking world with the filing of bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers. Construction on the railyards 
portion of the project stopped in early December of that year. The ESDC claimed that the 
stoppage was due to pending litigation, but an MTA spokesperson claimed on December 4th that 
the agency had not yet received the $100 million dollars from FCR for the property (Oder 
2008b). In mid-December, the Wall Street Journal reported that the project architect was ordered 
by FCR to cancel work on the project; Frank Gehry laid off his two-dozen or so Atlantic Yards 
staff. The Wall Street Journal linked the halt and cancellation of the Gehry contract to a pending 
loan that FCR had taken out with Gramercy Capital Corporation. The loan had accrued to $177 
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million, and was scheduled to come due two months hence, in February. While FCR was in talks 
to extend the loan, evidence suggests that the developer lacked the funds to both continue the 
project and make good on their debt (Wall Street Journal 2008). At this point, the stalls in 
construction due to both legal challenges and financial upheaval had reshaped the environment 
for the project. 
The pressure – both legal and financial – pushed FCR to once again alter its plans for the 
arena and surrounding development. The ESDC released, in June 2009, a Modified General 
Project Plan (MGPP) to the Atlantic Yards Land Use Improvement Civic Project. The MGPP 
included the acceleration of bureaucratic approvals and of government funding, including 
through the issuance of triple tax exempt municipal bonds; a reduction by about one third in the 
size of the project FCR is required to build; an “economic benefit analysis”; and a defense of the 
anticipated ten-year project timeline, issued without reference to the fact the project was already 
years behind schedule (UDC d/b/a ESDC 2009). The project and its proposed benefits had 
changed drastically. 
The community members opposing the plan, having exhausted any opportunity for relief 
in federal court, subsequently revitalized their eminent domain case in New York State Court. 
The basis of their argument claims that, even accepting the decision regarding the original plan’s 
public use benefit, the MGPP was so drastically different that it should not be permitted to stand 
on the previous case’s merits. The court agreed to hear the case when in session the coming 
October (State of New York Court of Appeals 2009). Alongside the appeal, the community also 
promoted an alternative development plan for the railyards, titled Understanding Imagining & 
Transforming the Yards (or UNITY). The plan is posited as a “viable development alternative to 
the proposal by Forest City Ratner Companies” (The Center for Community Planning and 
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Development 2007, 5). The plan, originally published in 2007, was an update to the Extell plan 
that had been developed alongside community stakeholders.  
The eminent domain case was heard for the last time in the New York State Court of 
Appeals in fall of 2009. During oral arguments, the plaintiff’s counsel drew considerable 
attention to the question of whether or not economic development constitutes a public use in the 
spirit of eminent domain law. The Empire State Development Corporation’s counsel focused 
primarily on whether or not the court had jurisdiction, questioning whether the plaintiffs were in 
compliance with a 30-day limitation on filing a petition. The decision was 6 to 1, with judge J. 
Smith penning an extremely brief dissent. Plaintiffs filed a motion to re-argue the case in the 
Supreme Court of New York, but that motion was denied in March of 2010 (Goldstein v. New 
York State Urban Development Corporation d/b/a Empire State Development Corporation, 13 
N.Y.3d 511(N.Y. App. Div. 2009)). The ruling in favor of ESDC was understood as “the last 
major hurdle” for the developers, who moved to sell a series of triple-tax-exempt bonds so as to 
begin financing construction almost immediately. At the same time, Ratner began conversations 
to sell the Nets basketball team to Russian billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov – constituting another 
massive injection of capital into the project (Bagli 2009). 
After the lawsuits challenging the eminent domain takings died, project opponents 
continued to resist the development through procedural and administrative legal practice. The 
project moved forward, albeit somewhat hampered. The lasting effects of the legal battle and 
resistances are reflected in the shifting project plans, timelines, and owners. The site is still under 
construction, many years behind schedule, and the built environment today only vaguely 








V: Developers, mapping, and imagining a neighborhood 
 
 What was Bruce Ratner’s vision for the neighborhood and community, post-
development? To be certain, the project served as a vehicle through which Ratner could 
accumulate both monetary wealth and real estate assets in an extremely valuable market, but the 
language of the development project suggests more than that. Critical engagement will, of 
course, take Ratner’s broad pronunciations for community growth with a block of salt; 
descriptions of an uplifted neighborhood post-development served the project’s financial 
objectives. But even if the developers’ interests in the neighborhood were exclusively financial, 
the means by which they sought to extract financial value demanded that they interpret the 
neighborhood and evoke alternative imaginations for it. At a bare minimum, the developers had 
to envision a land use transformation that complied with eminent domain law, even if the 
interpretation of that law hedged in their favor from the onset. Wrapped up in this process of 
visioning the community, to whatever ends, the developers necessarily produce one possible 
imagination of the neighborhood as it could be. 
 Ratner and his co-developers in the Empire State Development Corporation made 
extensive use of visual signifiers to reimagine the neighborhood in several ways. Maps in 
particular were commonly deployed as a means by which the developers could delimit and 
define the neighborhood, identifying areas that they believed needed improvement, and 
legitimizing the spatiality of their intended corrections. Mapping and cartography have 
historically been employed by those in power to (re)establish legitimacy through the invocation 
of data and objectivity that is made to seem unquestionable. This strategy is effective because 
map readers frequently “work from the premise that mappers engage in an unquestionably 
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‘scientific’ or ‘objective’ form of knowledge creation” (Harley 1989, 1). To their end, Ratner and 
his fellow developers very much counted on the courts to interpret their mappings in this way. 
 Following Harley’s call for an epistemological shift in how readers interpret maps and 
cartographers’ assertions about them (ibid), it is worthwhile to reread the maps produced by the 
Atlantic Yards developers. Reading ‘inbetween the lines’ of the developers’ maps allows an 
analysis that makes visible the very objects that the cartographers sought to obfuscate – the 
presence of communities, of livelihood, and of a vital community. Furthermore, deconstructing 
the developers’ maps clarifies their conceptualization of the neighborhood. Not unlike how early 
cartographers used maps to delineate territories for resource extraction, colonization, and the 
production of surplus value, the maps used by the Atlantic Yards developers’ make explicit an 
imagination of the neighborhood under the Atlantic Yards footprint as a place ripe for value 
maximization. Such an analysis unveils a great deal of the spatial and scalar imaginations that 
underpin their mode of development.  
That the judiciary proved so amenable to the impositions, expectations, and meanings 
conveyed by the developers is far from surprising. This susceptibility to outside influence is 
characterized in Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ interpretation of transitions in legal practice from 
enlightenment into the modern era. The law, de Sousa Santos argues, has undergone a 
Nietzschean metamorphosis in reverse: beginning idealistically and now being dominated by 
outside influence (de Sousa Santos 1987). The developers’ maps of the footprint serve as the 
primary vehicle for that influence. 
 It is not shocking, then, that a great deal of the developers’ mapping work served as the 
backbone of their legal argument justifying the use of eminent domain to condemn a 
considerable portion of the project’s footprint. As discussed previously, the developers’ central 
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argument was that the area was characterized by ‘blight’ – an amorphous term that has been 
regularly accepted as a legitimate basis for condemnation. The ESDC’s “Atlantic Yards Arena 
and Redevelopment Project: Blight Study” makes extensive use of maps and photographs to 
ultimately argue that “the 22-acre area proposed for the Atlantic Yards Arena and 
Redevelopment Project (“project site”) is characterized by blighted conditions” (2006, i), and 
that those conditions cannot be rectified without public intervention.  
 The formal definition of blight, in the New York State Constitution but in most other 
states as well, is already chimerical. By state law, condemnations to address blight are admissible 
with the presence of “substandard and insanitary” conditions (NY CONST. art. XVIII, § 1). 
Despite the generality written into the state’s constitution, it is clear that the interpretation of 
Article XVIII at its inception was in fact much narrower. The first case to interpret the 
amendment described the law as pertaining only to “slum areas” (Murray v. Laguardia, 52 
N.E.2d 884 (NY 1943)). The movement to expand the definition of blight came well after these 
initial cases (Somin 2011), and has been an effective tool to expedite condemnation proceedings. 
While many jurisdictions rolled back economic development justifications for eminent domain 
takings in the aftermath of the Supreme Court case Kelo v. City of New London, the definition of 
blight has remained expansive, and continues to do much of the same work as the economic 
development argument (ibid). Making the case that the project footprint was blighted was 
necessary for Ratner and the ESDC to unlock condemnation powers. 
 The Blight Study also serves as a clear example of how property cycles and market 
activity are produced and performed. Urban planner and economic geographer Rachel Weber 
argues that market cycles are not naturally occurring patterns, but are rather constructed 
interpretations imposed on markets in hindsight and produced through performativity. Weber 
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frames performativity in this context in the sense that “economic models and constructs help 
produce or enact the phenomena that they ostensibly describe” (2016, 593). Markets or cycles 
cannot be performed without actors, and Weber identifies the actors that make up a local real 
estate market as an epistemic community made up of market analysts, planners, developers and 
financiers, among others, which deploy market devices, analyses, and projections according to 
cyclical thinking, producing cycles in turn (ibid, 488). Weber argues that market cycles are 
performed in three primary ways. First, markets are set up to cycle because they rely on 
professionals using market devices which themselves contain “assumptions about appropriate 
timing of investment, disinvestment, and reinvestment.” Second, that market actors behave 
“collectively in concert”, which serves to smooth cyclical trends. And third, that the cycle 
metaphor offers an ordering of time that makes speculation on the future more enticing to 
financial interests (ibid, 588). In the case of the Atlantic Yards – Pacific Park project, the Blight 
Study can be understood as one such market device, deployed by market actors in order to 
perform a cycle of investment. 
 The Blight Study is broken up into six sections, with a number of appendices. The 
sections include a) an introduction to the project and explanation of the Blight Study’s analytical 
framework; b) a history of the area and overview of the site’s current condition; c) the physical 
and use characteristics of the properties in the footprint; d) a description of crime rates in the 
area; e) their explanation of the benefits of the proposed project; and f) a description of property 
ownership in the footprint. Maps and photographs are used most extensively in the third section 
(Section C), which documents the physical and land use characteristics of the blocks that fall in 
the redevelopment zone. In Section C, each block within the property is mapped, and each 
property within the block was photographed. The Blight Study also deploys some quasi-
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quantitative data in the fourth and fifth sections.  
 Each of the maps in Section C are remarkably similar, and each block is described in 
painstaking detail. The accompanying maps are simple – the area is shown in clean, straight 
black lines. Few features are given besides the block number, outlines of tax parcels within each 
block, and labels for the neighboring streets. Indeed, most blocks use the same map, and simply 
highlight which block and lot are being described with a simple arrow pointing to the lot on the 
map, as demonstrated in the three maps (Figs. 1 – 3) below: 
 
Figure 1 – ESDC Blight Study Map of Block 1127, Lot 19 (ESDC 2006, C-90) 
 




Any descriptive flourishes missing in the maps themselves are made up for in the Blight Study’s 
accompanying descriptions of the lots. Each lot is systematically described along seven vectors: 
land use, property ownership details and current zoning; unsanitary and unsafe conditions; 
indications of structural damage; building code violations; occupancy/vacancy status; 
underutilization; and environmental concerns. These attributes, taken in sum, congeal into the 
ESDC’s argument that the area is characterized by blight. The study states, “As described in 
detail throughout this report, the 22-acre project site is characterized by blighted conditions 
including structurally unsound buildings, debris-filled vacant lots, environmental concerns, high 
crime rates, and underutilization” (ESDC 2006, iii).  
 Following the maps, the study then lists photographs of each site, highlighting the 
described conditions. Absent from the maps in the Blight Study are any measure of community 
or human activity within the blocks and lots. However, the Blight Study ought not be judged on 
the criteria of something it doesn’t itself purport to be. It plays a specific role in articulating the 
developers’ conceptualization of the neighborhood, and points to an intentional and strategic 
alignment with the judicial position on measuring public benefit in eminent domain takings. In 
other words, the Blight Study needs to only make the case that there are blighted conditions, and 
Figure 3 - ESDC Blight Study Map of Block 1127, Lot 56 (ESDC 2006, C143) 
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that the project would yield a public benefit by improving upon those conditions. Any question 
of how the costs associated with providing that benefit measure against the neighborhood’s 
existing positive attributes is immaterial to the public seizure case. This strategy, further, allows 
the ESDC to veil their imagination of the neighborhood (as a vehicle for profit) in seemingly 
objective language and media.  
The accompanying land use, property ownership, and zoning description accompanying 
the map of Block 1127, Lot 19 (Fig. 1) relies heavily on pseudo-scientific language in order to 
describe particular, targeted attributes of the space. It begins:  
“Lot 19 is located at 620 Pacific Street, between 5th and 6th Avenues. Until Spring 2006, 
the lot was occupied by a vacant two-story, 3,158 gsf structure, which was formerly an 
auto repair shop (see Photograph A). The building was demolished by AYDC with 
approval from ESDC because of its dangerously deteriorated condition, as described 
below. 
Lot 19 is located in an R7A zoning district with a C2-4 overlay. R7A districts permit 
medium-density housing with a maximum FAR of 4.0. C2-4 districts accommodate retail 
and personal service shops needed in residential neighborhoods. When mapped in R7 
districts, the maximum commercial FAR in C2-4 districts is 2.0. Lot 19 is owned by 
AYDC, which purchased the property in April of 2006.”  
(ESDC 2006, C-90) 
 
The description reveals some glaring absurdities in the logic driving the development. First, the 
Blight Study is being conducted on properties already owned by the Atlantic Yards Development 
Corporation (which is yet another subgroup under the ESDC umbrella). The property whose 
condition is being touted as evidence for the need to exercise eminent domain – because it might 
be blighted – is already owned by the developers, negating the need for acquisition via public 
seizure. Second and more farcical still, the buildings on that property were demolished by the 
developer prior to the Blight Study’s publication. The photographs referenced in the property 
ownership description (Fig. 4-6) show a property that was leveled long before the Blight Study 
was conducted. Subsequent photographs included in the Blight Study show the building’s 
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crumbling interior, dilapidated walls and heaving subfloors. The Blight Study does not clarify 
when the photos were taken. Given the timeline of the Blight Study relative to the property’s 
demolition, it is entirely conceivable that those photographs document the demolition process or 
the neglected state of the property after it was sold to AYDC, and not the status quo pre-AYDC 
acquisition.  
 




Figure 5 - ESDC Photograph 1127-19-B (ESDC 2006, 92) 
 




Even accepting that the photographs accurately document the condition of the buildings prior to 
demolition, the logical argument that the condition of properties owned by an ESDC subsidiary 
should justify the taking of other properties through eminent domain is shaky at best. 
A considerable portion of each block and lot’s description in the Blight Study discusses 
the use and utilization of the spaces, and these attributes prove integral to the case that the overall 
area is characterized by blight. Utilization as the Blight Study defines it is ontologically narrow, 
focusing exclusively on the maximization of built space under current zoning regulations. A 
typical utilization review, in this case for Block 1127, Lot 46, reads: “Lot 46 is located in a R6B 
zoning district with an FAR of 2.0. According to current zoning, the 1,550 sf lot could 
accommodate up to 3,100 zsf of built space. The 2,400 gsf building currently located on the lot 
utilizes approximately 77 percent of the lot’s development potential” (ESDC 2006, C-122).  
Block 1127, Lot 46 is occupied by a multi-family residential building, which at the time 
of the Blight Study had also been purchased by the AYDC. The underutilization argument takes 
into account the Floor-Area Ratio (FAR) permitted under zoning (the allowable ratio of the 
building’s built square footage compared to its zoned lot size), and compares it to the current 
Gross Square Feet (GSF) (the actual amount of built space on the lot). For Block 1127, Lot 46, 
the FAR is 2.0, meaning that it is legal to build a building with up to two times the total square 
footage compared to the zoned lot size. In simple terms, a building that occupied the entire lot’s 
footprint could be two stories tall, or a building that occupied half of the lot’s footprint could be 
four stories tall. Because this lot is 1,550 square feet and its zoning allows for a FAR of 2.0, a 
building may consume up to 3,100 GSF. The current building, with 2,400 GSF utilizes only 77 
percent of the lot’s development potential. The language used in the Blight Study to describe 
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utilization is uniform from lot to lot. The study uses the language as a template and fills in the 
numbers for each block and lot. ‘Utilization’ in this sense refers only to the share of allowable 
square feet that a building may occupy, and not how the building is used, or by whom.  
Calculating and demonstrating undeveloped potential square footage is pivotal to the 
developers’ claims of underutilization, which constitutes the bridge between blight and economic 
development. Unrealized potential for built space translates into a failure to maximize the 
space’s use value. In the eyes of the developers, that undeveloped square footage could be an 
additional residential unit to be rented out, or a larger retail space to attract a higher-paying 
business tenant. Utilization as the ESDC frames it can be understood as synonymous with profit 
maximization. The existing homes and businesses on these properties are reduced to a block-lot 
identifier, and are further reduced to a vehicle for value generation. In this rhetorical and pseudo-
scientific shift, utilization comes to mean a property’s capacity to generate profit. Other 
frameworks for understanding utilization are erased in the process.  
What the developers are seeking here is to recover the value lost in the rent gap between 
the lot’s current and potential utilizations. Whether or not the plan is to retain the property, act as 
landlord and extract rent from tenants, or to sell off the property after its acquisition, the logic is 
the same. Neil Smith defines the rent gap as “the gap between the actual capitalized ground rent 
(land value) of a plot of land given its present use and the potential ground rent that might be 
gleaned under a ‘higher and better’ use [emphasis in the original] (1987, 462). Smith further 
identifies the role of historically cyclical investment and disinvestment in the rent gap’s 
production, and argues that gentrification is a means of closing that gap.  
Deconstructing the Blight Study reveals two major aspects of the logic underpinning the 
developers’ bid for an eminent domain taking. The first is the analysis of properties already 
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owned by the AYDC to justify the taking of other properties. This strategy works because, 
according to precedent in eminent domain law, an area need only be characterized by blight for 
parcels within it to be condemnable; it is not necessary for each parcel to be identified as 
blighted individually. The developers, in seeking the use of eminent domain for the Atlantic 
Yards project, effectively called for public action to address a problem that they literally owned. 
The second major aspect of the logic driving public seizure is the leap from underutilization (as 
conceived of as a rent gap) to blight. 
The rent gap argument makes clear that Ratner (and the city as represented by the public-
private partnership) imagine the neighborhood in primarily monetary terms. Their 
conceptualization of the community is rooted foremost in an understanding of the city as a means 
of capturing value. This is not surprising. Samuel Stein labels this formation of the city and its 
relation to value maximization through real estate planning the Real Estate State (2019). A core 
ideology of planning under the Real Estate State is the idea of ‘highest and best use’, which 
“turns land use planning into real estate appraisal, positing that the best use for any piece of land 
is that which derives the greatest value at the lowest cost and allows buildings to actualize their 
full potential rent” (ibid, 65).   
In the case of the Atlantic Yards project, the argument for eminent domain made by the 
developers reveals that the systems in which that mode of value capture is possible (i.e., 
neoliberal urbanism) are riddled with internal contradictions. The Atlantic Yards project itself 
would be untenable without the manipulation of the real estate market by the state through 
eminent domain and other state interventions such as rezoning and the issuance of tax exempt 
bonds. Furthermore, the action advocated by the developers’ is not for the city to directly address 
blighted conditions in the project area, it is to take the land and cede it to the developers for 
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demolition and reconstruction. To what public benefit, then is economic development in this 
context? The value captured by bridging the rent gap will either be held by FCR – a private firm 
– or will be sold to new prospectors also within the private sphere. Even accepting that economic 
development is a public use, it ought to follow that the public be the beneficiary of the 
anticipated economic windfall. 
 Deconstructing the text and images from the ESDC Blight Study shows that the project’s 
developers strategically framed the arguments in the Blight Study along two main axes. The first 
was to exploit the judiciary’s self-imposed limitations in defining public use. The developers 
understood that eminent domain case law dictates that only the existence of a public benefit is 
necessary to justify public seizure, and that the measure of that benefit against the benefit of 
keeping lands as they are is a non-factor. This understanding is shown in the Blight Study’s 
framing, and underscores the power differential between the developers who have frequently 
deployed eminent domain and the residents who were navigating that terrain for the first time. 
Further, the conflation of economic development with blight is not only consistent with a 
political-economic analysis of the developers as private entities in the capitalist class, but aligns 
with a broader framing of the city as a vehicle for profit generation through real estate 
maximization. This is underscored by the direct relationship of the project’s private developers to 
the city through public-private partnerships and quasi-public institutions such as the ESDC. That 
mapping was deployed as a spatial strategy to anchor these frameworks further stresses the need 





VI: Residents, opposition, and alternative visions 
 
The community activists and stakeholders that most vocally opposed the Atlantic Yards – 
Barclays Center (AYBC) development project were coded as ‘local’ in the predominant media 
coverage describing the dispute, and placed in contrast to the developers whose power was coded 
according to traditional hierarchical scales as emanating from the state (the political entities 
enabling the development), and as ‘global’ (the capital leveraged to make it happen). A March 
29th, 2004 New York Times article covering a rally in opposition to the project neatly captures 
this framing. In it, the protesters are “Brooklyn residents and business owners”, but their political 
positions are glossed over to instead emphasize that a “group of people played guitars, a 
mandolin and an accordion as they sang a hootenanny-style ballad called ‘Don’t Tear it Down’” 
(Moynihan 2004). The New York Times depicts the protesters as backwoods holdouts opposed 
to the inevitable and unquestioned advancement of a new urbanism. The protesters’ politics, in 
this presentation, are replaced with a spatial and scalar identity, which is then used to describe 
them as out of sync with the trajectory of urban development.  
The content of the rally and of the ensuing years-long struggle to stymy the Atlantic 
Yards – Barclays Center development project by its opponents, however, unveils a much more 
complex position. The projects’ detractors produced through resistance a wide array of textual 
artifacts; documents and artworks that simultaneously capture and progress their opposition. The 
objects produced through this resistance target a variety of audiences, such as other so-called 
local actors, city officials, developers, state-wide public-private partnerships, and multiple tiers 
of the city, state, and federal judiciary. The diversity of documents, and their content, promotes a 
reinterpretation of the project’s opposition that unseats commonly held scalar imaginations of the 
resistance as ‘local’, and AYBC and its allies ‘global’.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to interpret the documents and textural artifacts produced 
through resistance to the AYBC project, using a theoretical framework that accommodates the 
complex ways in which anti-development action navigates and deploys scale as it interweaves 
legalistic solutions with community-driven tactics. In a community meeting captured in the film 
‘Battle for Brooklyn’ (Hawley & Galinsky 2011), civil liberties attorney Norman Siegel 
addresses a concerned resident and compares the opposition to the biblical story of David and 
Goliath, a poetic attempt to invoke scalar power. The texts deconstructed here include certain 
legal documents produced through the formal challenge to the eminent domain taking, film and 
art produced as a component of community activism, and alternative urban planning proposals. 
The former manifests the most direct confrontation with the Atlantic Yards-Pacific Park project’s 
developers, while the latter contextualize the legal proceedings and improve the vantage point 
from which the legal process can be understood, while deploying scale discursively to generate 
soft power. 
Even accepting that the kind of neoliberal urban development characterized in Forest City 
Ratner’s Atlantic Yards-Pacific Project is the prevailing mode of planning, guided by the logic of 
capital, those modes and logics are far from universal. As an array of feminist theorists have 
pointed out, there are diverse ways of being, even in and through capitalism. Recognizing the 
alternatives offered by the AYBC’s opposition as “pericapitalist” forms of urban development – 
that is, modes that are simultaneously contained by and eluding capitalism (Tsing 2015, 63) – 
furnishes an analysis of the project’s opposition with critical importance. 
 Despite their strategies that cut across traditional notions of scale, the key actors in the 
resistance often describe themselves in language that reinforces the global-local dialectic. In the 
film “A Walk Through the Footprint”, produced by Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn (DDDB), 
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the advocacy group’s founder David Goldstein summarizes the landscape of resistance. He says, 
“This is not just a fight against Ratner. I mean, City Hall is behind this, Albany is behind this. 
The community boards are not interested in hearing what people who actually live and rent here 
think. This has been imposed on us” (DDDB 2006). Goldstein is right, but he also sells his 
movement short. In this excerpt he reinforces a few familiar notions in the global-local dialectic, 
as illuminated by J.K. Gibson-Graham. First, that the dialectic is brought to bear in the practice 
of everyday life, and is therefore real. Second, that the relationship of the global to the local is 
one of containment; that the local is understood to fall within, but is still separate from, the 
global. And Third, that the power-dynamics defining the global-local dialectic are lopsided in 
favor of the former such that the global may impose its whims and follies upon the local 
(Gibson-Graham 2002).  
 The dialectic that Goldstein frequently reinforces, while in some cases strategic, is 
complicated by his own group’s goals and achievements8. That DDDB and its community 
partners are advocating for themselves at a variety of scales undermines an analysis that 
considers each actor as occupying specific scalar positions within a hierarchical or tiered 
framework. Furthermore, the impacts on the project driven by its opponents disprove 
commonplace assumptions, often expressed by the opponents themselves, about the one-sided 
power relationship that defines hierarchies of scale. While the community members opposing the 
 
8 Goldstein himself is a complicated character and potentially an unreliable narrator at the 
forefront of the residents’ movement. The documentary ‘Battle for Brooklyn’ (Hawley & 
Galinsky 2011) describes a rift among the neighborhood’s residents and their buy-in to the 
opposition efforts, with lower- and middle-class, longer-term residents on one end and 
professional-class, newer residents on the other. For the latter group, of which Goldstein is a 
part, a primary concern with the development is the impact it will have on their home values. 
This concern complicates the opposition particularly as they cast the developers and involved 
politicians as capitalists disinterested in the neighborhoods character; many of the residents’ 
concerns stem from a related monetary logic. 
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development deployed scale discursively for political power, the tangled actions and 
interrelationships between themselves, the community, the developers, and other players in the 
landscape suggest that hierarchical scale models do not accurately capture the reality on the 
ground.  
 The fact that AYBC’s opponents have effectively resisted the development may not seem 
obvious when standing on the corner of Atlantic and Flatbush Avenues, where the Barclays 
Center now looms to the north, and where the nearby skyline is anointed with new high-rise 
buildings. But comparing the state of the development today to its proposed timeline, it becomes 
clear that the project’s opponents have influenced the built environment. In more abstract terms, 
there is a recognizable distance between the reality of the space today and the spatial imaginary 
of the developers who believed the project would be completed in 2016. The ways in which the 
site diverges from the developers’ imagination were produced in part through the project’s 
opponents performing the (socio-) legal and the (socio-) spatial. Specifically, the negotiation of 
competing imaginaries through the eminent domain process gave rise to legal, financial, and 
social materialities that hindered the developers’ progress. The resulting situation – the actual 
site as it is today – is the product of those entangled and diverging spatial, scalar, and legal 
imaginaries. 
 The project, originally slated for completion by 2016, is years behind schedule and it is 
likely that it will never be finished as intended. From within a hierarchical conceptualization of 
urban scale, then, it appears that AYBC’s opponents have in their resistance effectively ‘jumped 
scale’. While Neil Smith used the term to describe ‘homeless vehicles’ – operative sculptures by 
artist Krzysztof Wodiczo that constitute an intervention in the landscape of homelessness – it fits 
aptly in the struggles over the AYBC project. Smith defines jumping scale as the characteristic of 
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being able “to organize the production and reproduction of daily life and to resist oppression at a 
higher scale – over a wider geographical field” (1992, 60). 
 Smith’s understanding of jumping scale invokes a top-down conceptualization of power 
that itself relies on a hierarchical imagination of scale. While he allows for disadvantaged groups 
to resist oppression at scales other than their own, his framework does not push against the 
conceptualization of scale and its power-relations as hierarchical or vertical. J.K. Gibson-Graham 
argue that to Smith (and to Harvey, Swygdenouw, and Hardt and Negri as well), the global/local 
binary is constructed such that the local is subsumed within the global, subject inherently to be 
undermined, appropriated, and acted upon by processes of globalization (2002). Feminist critique 
as a method provides valuable approaches to unfix dialectics that situate local resistance within a 
landscape predetermined to favor city, state, or global power. These analytical frameworks are 
similarly instructive for reinterpreting eminent domain as a scalar process without reinforcing 
hierarchies that elevate global over local actors. J.K. Gibson-Graham have recommended 
deconstruction and resubjectivation as two strategies for “challenging the power of the 
global/local binary” (ibid, 30). Having identified both the values and shortcomings of 
deconstructing the global/local binary (as I described in Chapter 2) Gibson-Graham turn to 
resubjectivation, which they define as “a set of embodied interventions that attempt to confront 
and reshape the ways in which we live and enact the power of the global” (ibid, 30). What would 
it look like to submit the Atlantic Yards-Barclays Center project’s opposition to a course of 
resubjectivation? 
Foremost, the givenness of hierarchies used to describe the actors in the fray – the residents 
and Atlantic-Yards project developers – must be called into question. The easiest way to 
reimagine the actors’ scalar positionality is to set aside the self-descriptive language they employ 
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and focus instead on the impacts of their work. This line of critique draws on Marston et al.’s flat 
ontology (2005) alongside Katherine Jones’ explanation of how parties in political disputes 
deploy scale “as a representational trope, a way of framing political-spatiality that in turn has 
material effects (1998, 27). In this sense, it is easy to see the developers as simultaneously local 
and global, or as neither. The developers’ work, which is motivated in part by the logics and 
power of global finance, produces globalized changes in space (opening up real estate for 
international investment; mobilizing multi-national capital through a global city), at the same 
time that it creates local change (rezoning a neighborhood; building over an exposed railyard; 
creating new jobs and housing) within the rough boundaries of a neighborhood, or the ‘site’. The 
same is true for the project’s opponents. Their efforts towards community self-determination and 
–actualization also have global impacts, such as stymying financial investment and transforming 
the narrative surrounding developers.  
Smith’s intervention in rethinking the role and meaning of homeless vehicles provides a 
useful avenue for analyzing the relationship between social processes, their physical 
embodiments, and the often jumbled and tumultuous relationship between those processes and 
scale. Following this intervention, eminent domain can be interpreted as a socio-legal process 
characterized, in part, by its capacity to jump scale as it reorganizes economic and social space. 
As a socio-legal process, jumping scale in this context happens within the discursive deployment 
of traditional hierarchies, and affects sites within the real world that are simultaneously many 
scales, or are flat. The eminent domain statute simultaneously expedites the transcending of scale 
in ways which challenge normally held relations of power, whilst circumscribing the reach of 
resistance. The statute creates avenues for resistance through which site-based actors may 
challenge hegemonic power across a variety of sites, including cities, states, or nations. We can 
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interpret project opponents’ community activism mobilizations that happened in parallel with 
their legal challenge as part of a flat or trans-scalar entanglement. 
 The homeless vehicles to which Smith refers are sculptures made by the artist Krzysztof 
Wodiczko. Smith’s intervention is especially relevant, as multi-media art served as one of the 
primary methods deployed by the community in opposition to the Atlantic Yards – Barclays 
Center development. Activists used artistic renderings of neighborhood life to instantiate 
imaginations of the community before AYBC, as well as what it might be after the project is 
completed. In what Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn calls ‘photo simulations’, renderings of the 
neighborhood after the development show street life dwarfed by new high rise developments and 
luxury apartments. In contrast with the photographs deployed in Forest City Ratner’s 
commissioned Blight Study, DDDB photographed the buildings that would be taken by eminent 
domain through a different lens. Rather than training their camera on garbage or crumbling 
driveways, DDDB documented the communal life in the neighborhood, including long-time 
residents chatting on stoops, well maintained homes, and politically active streets. 
 








Figure 9 - Photo Compilation of 473, 485, 479, and 483 Dean Street (DDDB)  
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 Tidily kept homes and street life conjure notions of a healthy neighborhood. The 
residents’ argument here is that the neighborhood is cannot be blighted given the utilization, the 
sanitariness, and the upkeep shown. The logic underlying the photos lionizes aspects of property 
ownership and neighborhood communality in ways that diminish the role of city, state, and 
global financial politics in the making of the neighborhood. What is missed in the DDDB photo 
essay is the narrative of how the neighborhood came to be targeted for neoliberal urban 
redevelopment in the first place. Urban neighborhoods do not become ripe for urban 
redevelopment through natural processes, but rather through socio-spatial and socio-legal 
activities that produce cycles of disinvestment and reinvestment. Taking that context into 
account, what the photos show is extraordinary resiliency in the face of long-term disinvestment. 
DDDB presents the photos without this framing or history, maybe strategically. Ironically, those 
visual signifiers of disinvestment are the very subject of the ESDC Blight Study. In the case of 
the Blight Study they are similarly presented without context, but to a different end. The 
community performs resiliency not only in the ongoing life at the street level, but in the capacity 
and will to collectively imagine alternative futures for the neighborhood. 
 Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn further framed their own conception of the 
neighborhood in contrast with a faceless development regime through protest art. The poster 
‘Stop Atlantic Yards’ (Fig. 10) combines photography with computer art to convey an 
understanding of scale in alignment with the project opponents’ conception of ideal urban 
spaces. In the poster, a photograph of the Dean Playground, located on the block circumscribed 
by Dean Street, Bergen Street, 6th Avenue and Carlton Avenue, is combined with computer 
renderings of high rise towers in block rectangular shapes devoid of details. The photograph in 
the foreground shows people utilizing the park, some playing basketball and others sitting around 
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watching and socializing. The images of the buildings do not contain windows or any other 
element that is suggestive of social life. The development renderings in the background tower 
over the playground, drawing into contrast the literal vertical scale of the development with that 
of the neighborhood at its feet. 
 Another protest poster, titled “Supersize Brooklyn” (Fig. 11), was used in DDDB’s 
advocacy efforts. The poster poses the question “Supersize Brooklyn?” and answers in 
stereotypical New York fashion: “FUHGEDDABOUDIT!”. In its center, renderings of the 
development’s skyline as viewed from Park Slope are shown. A few local geographic signifiers 
point to the size and shape of the project, which the poster describes as “proposed 
overdevelopment”. On the far left is a rendering of the Williamsburg Savings Bank Tower, a 
clock tower erected in 1929 that was at the time of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park proposal the 
tallest building in Brooklyn. The skyline renderings show the clock tower dwarfed by the 
Atlantic Yards’ luxury residential and commercial skyscrapers, signifying the death of Brooklyn 




Figure 10 - "Stop Atlantic Yards" Poster (DDDB) 
 
 
Figure 11 - "Supersize Brooklyn?" Poster (DDDB) 
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 In addition to multi-media art as a means to convey possible futures for the 
neighborhood, the residents also participated in actively planning an alternative development. 
The UNITY plan (The Center for Community Planning and Development 2007), presented as an 
alternative to the Ratner plan, reflects this forward-thinking trend among the neighborhoods 
residents. It also neatly frames a critique of the forces at play in the Atlantic Yards/Barclays 
Center eminent domain taking, and is reflective of the entangled relationships and processes 
defining the site. The document interweaves legal claims with narratives describing cyclical 
investment and disinvestment, and ultimately proposes an alternative development model for the 
railyards (but not the adjacent residential and commercial blocks). Broadly, the UNITY plan 
considers three potential scenarios that might require an alternative vision for the area’s 
development. First, it claims that due to legal proceedings or potential economic shifts, Forest 
City Ratner may have no option but to delay or permanently halt their project. Second, that the 
phased structure of FCR’s plan allows the developers to opt out of the remainder of the 
development after completing the first phase (the basketball arena and four towers), which could 
leave the railyards untouched and the surrounding blocks vacant. Third, that the FCR plan is 
likely to take considerably longer than was originally intended, and that the UNITY plan could 
be leveraged as a guide for any modifications made to the plan as time goes on (ibid, 5). In its 
own terms, the UNITY plan is not framed as an alternative based on community demands, but as 
a response to economic or legalistic pitfalls that might torpedo the Ratner plans completion, 
leaving a void in the neighborhood. To its credit, the first two scenarios anticipated in the 
UNITY plan came to be. 
 The UNITY plan was designed through a participatory planning process, where residents 
and activists met with architects and planners to devise alternative and contingency development 
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models should the Forest City Ratner plan fall through or be only partially completed. 
Participants in the planning process identified eight principles to guide their design:  
“connect Prospect Heights, Fort Greene and other neighborhoods; develop at a human 
scale and density; promote diversity and vitality in urban design; create and preserve 
affordable housing; reduce traffic, improve mass transit; create jobs for Brooklyn 
residents; create truly usable and accessible public spaces; guarantee an open planning 
process, with transparency and accountability”. (ibid, 3)  
 
The UNITY plan designers deploy mechanisms of urban planning similar to those deployed by 
FCR, but with different goals in mind. 
 In addition to the elements of urban design written into the UNITY plan, the residents’ 
proposed alternative was designed to circumvent the need for an eminent domain seizure in the 
first place. This was achieved by shifting the site of the plan’s arena from privately-held 
property, as it was laid out in the FCR plan, to property already owned by FCR on an adjacent 
lot. In a press conference captured in the documentary Battle for Brooklyn, Parsons School of 
Design professor Joel Towers explains that “should one shift this project so that the arena is no 
longer located on private property but rather is located on the property owned already by Mr. 
Ratner, it would be possible to eliminate the eminent domain problem associated with this 
project” (Hawley, Suki and Galinsky, 2011). Towers is referring to the Atlantic Terminal mall, 
also a Ratner development, which sits at the intersection of Atlantic and Flatbush avenues, in the 
space carved out created by the opposite angle of the Barclays Center site. 
 Interestingly, the UNITY plan leverages notions of scale discursively in ways that align 
more closely with the project opponents than the FCR project, despite the fact that both the 
UNITY plan and FCR conduct work in the terms of urban planning and redevelopment. In its 
self-descriptive section “Why UNITY?”, the planners write, “Seen from a distance, and through 
the lenses of Forest City Ratner, the Vanderbilt Rail Yards look like a blighted area in downtown 
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Brooklyn. In fact, the area is neither blighted nor in downtown Brooklyn” (The Center for 
Community Planning and Development 2007, 9). Here, the UNITY plan designers deploy scale 
in the form of proximity to/distance from the development site and neighborhood to make the 
case for their authenticity and FCR’s foreignness. The way scale is deployed then is tied less to 
the medium and more to the actors. 
The UNITY plan was not the only example of the project’s opponents utilizing the terms 
and mechanisms of urban planning and development in their resistance to the FCR plan. Based in 
large part on the UNITY plan’s first iteration, residents convinced commercial developer Extell 
to submit a competing bid for the Vanderbilt Yards development project, aiming to displace the 
FCR bid by offering a higher valuation. A scene in the documentary Battle for Brooklyn captures 
the moment when one of the lead resident actvists, Shabnam Merchant, gets off the phone with 
representatives from Extell having successfully worked out the terms of the Extell bid (Hawley 
and Galinsky 2011). 
The documentary Battle for Brooklyn captures much of the turmoil surrounding the 
Atlantic Yards development and the use of eminent domain to acquire land for it. While the 
producers interview both resident opponents and representatives from Forest City Ratner, the 
documentary is sympathetic to the residents’ cause. Captured in the documentary, Forest City 
Ratner’s then-Executive Vice President Bruce Bender says  
“Change is difficult. And if you look at society as a whole, you look at the city as a 
whole, you look at the nation as a whole, and I can talk about New York. Rockefeller 
Center, as an example. It’s a great place! I wasn’t around when it was I guess created but 
I go there now. And you know something, it’s terrific. But I know, doing some research, 
that people opposed it. Think about all the things, that if everybody said we should not 
have, what would the city be about? What would this state be about? What would this 




Bender thinks of the Atlantic Yards – Pacific Park development as “being able to have 
something”. He sees the project footprint as terra nullius, a blank slate, and the residents 
opposing the development as advocating against a vacuum being filled. The residents, through 
their organizing, opposition, and very presence, put forth an alternative imagination of what 
exists and what the project footprint could be. 
 Through their efforts, the residents opposed to the Atlantic Yards – Pacific Park plan 
produced artifacts across a variety of media that capture their alternative vision for how the 
neighborhood can and should be developed. In contrast with the FCR’s imagination of the 
community, resident activists depict a lively community that ought to be fostered rather than an 
underutilized area that ought to be replaced. Efforts by resident opponents to the FCR plan 
through legal action and community organizing, combined with a shifting economic backdrop, 
effectively impacted the FCR plan. In doing so, activists frequently deployed traditional notions 
of hierarchical scale as a discursive strategy. The actual impacts on the development project, 
however, suggest that a hierarchical scalar framework does not sufficiently explain the 
relationships between different actors and space. The current state of the project site which has 
been transformed over years by different visions of the neighborhood, through eminent domain 
proceedings and activism, demands a different geographic intervention. In the next chapter I will 
explore how a fusion of critical legal and feminist geographies help make sense of the project 




VII: Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park as a Nomosphere 
 
 The competing representations of the site of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park development 
project by its developers and opponents constitute opposing sides of a discursive practice. 
Through this practice, each side has leveraged differing conceptions of idealized urban life, and 
has situated their arguments in normative conceptions of scale. The site of the development has 
always been materially produced through cycles of investment and disinvestment, and the 
movement of people and capital, and in many ways those cycles were informed by legal practice. 
The particular convergence of imaginaries taking place around the Atlantic Yards project makes 
the relationship between spatiality and legality more legible, as those competing representations 
explicitly leveraged a judicial system and an administrative system in the struggle over who has 
the right to define the landscape. One central question that legal geographers frequently ask is 
“where is the law?” (Delaney, Ford and Blomley, 2001). Nested within that question are 
challenges to the nature of law, its givenness, and the relationship between law and space. Legal 
practice simply cannot exist without spaces for it to act in and on. In this sense, the site of the 
Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project offers a valuable case study into the ways in which spatial 
practice informs the legal, and legal practice informs the spatial.  
 In his essay “Landscapes of Property”, Nicholas Blomley describes the local activism 
opposing a 1994 downtown development project in Vancouver, Canada, with dynamics eerily 
similar to those at play in the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project. In the Vancouver case, local 
activists leverage notions of community and local agency to oppose a development project they 
characterize as driven by ‘global’ capital, and which would usher in mass displacement of 
longtime residents (2001). Blomley argues that “positive portrayals of community life and its 
members can often entail a form of ‘strategic essentialism,’ a savvy choice” (ibid, 127). Here he 
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describes the decision to emphasize certain elements of public life as part of the discursive 
practice wrapped up in struggles over space. In Brooklyn, hte “savvy choice” is mirrored in the 
residents’ opposition to the Atlantic Yards project, where those signifiers of belonging were 
deployed not only in public debate, but in the courthouse as well. Over time and as the project 
development timeline wore on, the nature of the project opponents’ legal challenges shifted from 
claiming grievances under constitutional law towards obfuscating the timely completion of the 
project through administrative practice. It is possible that this second category had the greatest 
bearing on the actual built space in Brooklyn today. 
 The idea that the mutual constitution of law and space plays a heavy hand in the creation 
of social reality is fairly obvious. The challenge that critical legal geography issues is to interpret 
events or sites in ways that do not reify normative understandings of space (e.g., hierarchical 
scale) and the law (e.g., the givenness of authority) (Delaney 2010). David Delaney describes 
how interpreting phenomena as either spatial or legal leads to elevating certain features over 
others. He further argues that “conventional ways of understanding either the legal or the spatial 
may have the effect of stabilizing conventional ways of understanding and assessing the other” 
(ibid, 7). Considering how the opponents to the Atlantic Yards plan discursively deployed scale 
to position themselves as local and authentic and the developers as global and sterile, as 
described in the preceding chapter, offers a good glimpse into the intertwined conventional 
understandings of both space and law. 
 Delaney offers the concept of the ‘nomosphere’ as an intervention that escapes the 
reifying effects of normative analysis.  He defines the nomosphere as “the cultural-material 
environs that are constituted by the reciprocal materialization of “the legal”, and the legal 
signification of the “socio-spatial”, and the practical, performative engagements through which 
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such constitutive moments happen and unfold (2004, 851). The nomosphere, in other words, is a 
material and social reality that comes into being through the co-constitution of law and space, 
and the performance of both. In the case of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project, the 
nomosphere might reflect the current social reality, or what exists at the site today. It came to be 
through the performance and implementation of the legal and the spatial.  
While the coalition of residents and commercial tenants opposing the Atlantic 
Yards/Pacific Park project did not bring the skirmish into a courthouse until 2006 with the 
beginning of the case Goldstein v. Pataki, legal and spatial performativity began much earlier. 
One could begin in the meetings leading up to the project’s 2003 announcement, where Forest 
City Ratner would have strategized around the development, planning the launch and thinking 
through the mechanisms that would ensure its success. One could go further back, and situate the 
project within a longer trajectory of urban (re)development in Brooklyn, its oppositions, and the 
related struggles over gentrification, displacement, and property values across the borough. For 
the purposes of this chapter, I will describe legal and spatial performativity as it gave rise to the 
project site as a nomosphere beginning with the project’s legal challenges in federal and state 
courts, and moving forward through the practice of administrative law. 
In the case Goldstein v. Pataki, first brought before the Eastern District of New York (a 
Federal District Court), the legal challenge held broad terms. The plaintiffs focused on three 
constitutional violations. First, a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment; 
second, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and third, a 
violation of the Due Process clause of the fourteenth amendment (Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. 
Supp. 2d 254, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  
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 The fifth amendment claim contends that the means with which eminent domain was 
deployed (or was intended to be deployed) in the project’s development violated the precedent 
set out in Kelo v New London (545 U.S. 469, 2005). As discussed in earlier, Kelo was a landmark 
case in that it signified a shift in the eminent domain paradigm wherein economic development 
was classified as a public benefit sufficient to justify the taking of private property through 
public seizure. Further, in Kelo, the private property taken was then provided to another private 
developer. While to many this precedent might signify an uphill battle on fifth amendment 
grounds, Matthew Brinckerhoff – the council representing the plaintiffs – relied on some of the 
more nuanced details in the Kelo decision to support their claims.  
 The decision in Kelo allowed for a taking, but stipulated that there must be a planning 
process involved. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the decision noted that “the 
respondents reviewed a variety of development plans and chose a private developer from a group 
of applicants rather than picking out a particular transferee beforehand” (Kelo v. New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (Kennedy A. concurring)). In the Atlantic Yards case, the plaintiffs argued 
that the usage of a single developer and refusal of the ESDC to consider other bids constituted a 
clear departure from the stipulations set forth in Kelo. The Atlantic Yards suit moved many of 
the arguments being made locally, through political practice, discourse and organizing, into the 
legal arena. In particular, that the costs of the project were undisclosed, that the elimination of 
blight was not listed as a goal in the 2003 project unveiling, and that the affordable housing and 
jobs benefits were overstated. That the lawsuit first came in federal court instead of state court 
was also a strategic decision with spatial considerations. Plaintiffs worried that the state court 
system would be insufficiently insulated from local politics, and therefore may be hostile. 
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 The defendants in the case (Forest City Ratner, the Empire State Development 
Corporation, then-Mayor Pataki, and associates) moved to have the case dismissed. They argued 
that permitting federal litigation would thwart the policies set forth in New York’s Eminent 
Domain Procedural Law (EDPL) intended to promote efficiency and litigation (Goldstein v. 
Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)). In his decision, Judge Garaufis states that his 
concern “is with the EDPL’s coherence, not with any of its other virtues, such as reducing 
litigation and promoting efficiency”, but that he will not consider whether the project constitutes 
a public use (ibid 274).  
 Further in Judge Garaufis decision, he approaches scale as he describes local political 
processes in contradiction with legal processes. Regarding those differences, e writes, 
“Defendants seem to conflate (1) the political process of selecting public projects and sites for 
condemnation and (2) the legal process of determining whether a particular project serves a 
‘public use’ under the United States Constitution” (ibid 274). Framed alongside the case for a 
nomospheric understanding of phenomena, the argument being made in Judge Garaufis decision 
relies on two conventional spatial imaginaries. First, that political processes are situated within a 
scalar hierarchy, and in the case of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project those processes are 
hyper-local. The second is that legal practice exists outside of any scalar analysis. While the 
second assertion might on the surface level reflect some of the underpinnings of a flat ontology 
analysis, the decision doesn’t remove federal law and legal practice from hierarchical scale 
alone, but from spatiality in its entirety. He continues,  
“But this court is not being asked to evaluate the political questions underlying the Project. This 
case simply does not require the court to consider whether the Project is a good idea or whether it 
can be achieved only by taking Plaintiffs’ properties as opposed to other properties or no 
properties at all. Instead, the issue before the court is whether the taking of Plaintiffs’ properties 
is rationally related to a conceivable public use, as required by the United States Constitution” 




To that end, the onus is put on the plaintiffs to prove that the takings at issue violate the public 
use requirement of the Fifth Amendment, an exceedingly high bar given the latitude allowed in 
defining public use. 
 Here, too, issues of spatiality come into play in Judge Garaufis’ decision. The coalition of 
homeowners and commercial property owners that brought the suit argued that their individual 
buildings were not blighted, no matter the condition of the broader neighborhood. These 
arguments were supported by some of the photographs and multimedia work described in 
Chapter Six, and which were entered into evidence in Goldstein v. Pataki. The Judge, however, 
applied a ruling standard from the 1954 case Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 26), claiming property 
that itself may be innocuous may be taken for redevelopment “if the redevelopment is intended 
to cure and prevent reversion to blight in some larger area that includes the property” (Goldstein 
v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp 2d 254, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)). At play in the legal analysis are the 
conventional spatial concepts of boundaries and containment.  
On June 6th, 2007, Judge Garaufis granted the defendant’s request for dismissal. He 
writes, “Because Plaintiffs concede that the project will create large quantities of housing and 
office space, as well as a sports arena, in an area that is mostly blighted, Plaintiffs’ allegations, if 
proven, would not permit a reasonable juror to conclude that the “sole purpose” of the project is 
to confer a private benefit” (ibid 290). The plaintiffs appealed Judge Garaufis dismissal and in 
October 2007 appeared before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which in 2008 issued a 
decision upholding the Eastern District court’s dismissal (Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F. 3d 50 (2nd 
Cir. 2008)). Finally, the plaintiff’s attempted to elevate the decision to the United States Supreme 
Court, which denied to hear the case, ending the suit but not extinguishing a broader legal 
strategy that the residents would bring. 
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 While Goldstien v. Pataki was moving through the federal court system, the residents 
opposed to the Atlantic Yards/Barclays Center project also entered a number of suits in the New 
York state court system attacking the project on various fronts. Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn 
shifted its strategy to deploy procedural law, forcing roadblocks at the various steps in the 
development process including environmental review, the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure. 
At the same time, DDDB moved to repeat its eminent domain complaint in the New York court 
system. 
 The New York State Court of Appeals is unique in that the court allows video recording 
of oral arguments within its chambers. As of this writing, the owner of Freddy’s, the bar and 
commercial tenant in the lawsuit, maintains the video recording of the Goldstein v. New York 
Urban Development Corporation (921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)) oral arguments on its 
YouTube account. In oral arguments, the plaintiffs’ counsel Matthew Brinckerhoff focuses on 
the interpretation of economic benefits as a public use. Brinckerhoff argues against the idea of 
sub-maximal economic utilization as an indicator of blight as laid out in the ESDC Blight Study.  
Focusing on the geography of the site, a Judge asks what he frames as a “favorable” 
question to Brinckerhoff. The judge delineates the development site into ‘north’ and ‘south’ 
sections, with the north containing the railyards and largely commercial zones, and the south 
containing the residential areas where many of the plaintiffs reside. He says,  
“… the blight study certainly says that the project site as a whole is characterized by 
blight. I got the impression in reading it that what they’re really saying is that the 
northern part is blighted and the southern part has a few problems but when you add it all 
up together it’s blighted. That’s different than saying the southern part is blighted. This is 
obviously, from your perspective, a friendly question … but do you see it the same way I 




In his response, however, Brinckerhoff elects to not comment on the geographic distinction and 
instead refocuses on whether or not economic utilization constitutes blight in the first place.  
 Across multiple lawsuits and court systems, questions touching on the spatiality of the 
development project consistently reified conventional norms about scalar hierarchy, legal non-
spatiality, and the relationship between the two. Brinckerhoff deflecting the question on 
spatiality in order to discuss the definition of blight and economic utilization constitutes a 
discursive and strategic decision based on his notions of how the legal system conceives of space 
and scale. While the judge’s question was posed as “friendly”, previous litigation and outcomes 
in related cases suggest that Brinckerhoff’s attempt to reorient the conversation towards non-
spatiality was strategic and maybe the best tactic in the moment. Taken outside the frame of 
traditional legal analysis, almost every issue at question in the project’s multiple eminent domain 
cases are spatial in that they refer to territory, containment, and claims to space that are both 
cultural and material. Repeatedly over the course of the eminent domain trials, however, both in 
federal and state systems, courts adhered to and reproduced a logic of non-spatiality. 
Nomosphericity points to how through both normative spatial and legal practice, and despite the 
courts’ insistence on non-spatial logic, an entirely novel space came to be.  
 Scalar imaginations at play in the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park site are not limited to the 
aesthetic products of the development’s proponents, nor of its opponents (the textual artifacts 
described in Chapters Five and Six, respectively). Those imaginations are present in and are 
seemingly coproduced with the legal struggles over the project. Outside of the failed federal 
challenge to the eminent domain taking, and the failed state challenge in the New York Court of 
Appeals, Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn and other stakeholders contested the development 
through local administrative law. The law firm Young Sommer, representing DDDB, filed 
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comments in response to the project’s 2009 Modified General Project Plan (MGPP). The MGPP 
changed to some extent the original project plan, shifting development timelines and 
enumerating the civic benefits to the arena plan from the developers’ perspective. The 2009 
MGPP contends that despite the changes to the original plan, the project should not repeat an 
analysis mandated under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (which had been 
conducted after the initial plan was submitted), nor should it repeat an analysis determining its 
Land Use Improvement Project and Civic Project statuses (UDC d/b/a ESDC 2009). Young 
Sommers, representing DDDB, contests both of these claims. 
The Young Sommers comments argue that the changes in the development project’s plan 
undermine the originally stated public benefit of the development across two primary vectors. 
The first is that the MGPP fails to take into account the renegotiated contract between the 
developers and the Metropolitan Transit Authority resulting in flawed calculations of the 
project’s economic benefit (Young Sommers LLC, 2). The second is that the non-financial case 
for public benefit – namely the urban design improvements – were negated when famed architect 
Frank Gehry withdrew from the planning and design process (ibid, 5). Smaller impediments to 
the development process such as the challenge to the MGPP had considerable impacts on the 
trajectory of the development. While the developers consistently won out in these procedural and 
administrative challenges, responding to the challenges drew on staff time and capacity resulting 
in delayed project timelines and changed plans, and the built environment changed with it. 
In parallel with the developers promoting the project and the residents’ opposing it in the 
public view, the terms of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park development project were negotiated, 
limited, and changed through legal challenges. Understanding the project, both how it was 
imagined and how it has so far come to be, means thinking about the project in terms of its social 
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reality. Nomosphericity in combination with feminist geographic critiques of scalar hierarchy 
help explain the relationship between the site as either side imagined it and the site that exists 
today. Both the project’s proponents and opponents put forth imaginaries of the development, 
and neither map directly on to the social reality, or the material results of ongoing contention. In 
a variety of ways, social reality is produced through the mutual co-production of the legal and 
the spatial. The legal battles over the Atlantic Yards/Barclays Center development only drive that 






Where is the Atlantic Yards – Barclays Center project now? The stadium is built and has 
been occupied for almost a decade. The Brooklyn Nets still call it home, and the National 
Hockey League’s Islanders are planning a move to Brooklyn. Several of the commercial and 
residential towers have been built, though not all of them are standing or are currently slated for 
construction. Vanderbilt Yards still sits mostly untouched, like an open wound where the 
neighborhoods converge. The renovated train yard, arguably the most tangible and least 
debatable public-use aspect of the development, has languished. In October 2019, the Greenland 
Group (the projects current owners9) announced that work on the railyard would begin in 2020 
(Cuozzo 2019). As of November 2020, plans for the railyard platform and tower design had not 
been approved (Oder 2020). The most recent plans place the majority of the project’s affordable 
housing units in four of the six towers slated to be built atop the railyard, and city officials are 
dubious that the affordable housing component of the development will meet its 2025 deadline 
(Aponte and Smith 2019). Stepping beyond the original project’s footprint, the mode of 
development looks very much the same – massive new high-rise towers, mostly of luxury 
condominiums have gone up at rapid pace. One houses an Apple Store that looks like a space 
ship. 
Stepping further back from the project footprint, the struggle over the Pacific Park project 
has had impacts across the city’s landscape. In 2009, a few miles from the Atlantic Yards site, 
another eminent domain taking was challenged in court. The Columbia University Educational 
 
9 In December 2013, Forest City Enterprises reported a $242 million impairment of its Atlantic 
Yards investment. The Greenland Corporation – a majority Chinese government-owned 
development group- bought its share for $200 million, a considerable discount. 
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Mixed Use Development Land Use Improvement and Civic Project was supported by the New 
York State Urban Development Corporation in its bid to use eminent domain to acquire property 
for an expansion of the private university’s campus. In Kaur v. New York State Development 
Corp. (933 NE 2d 721, (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)), the New York Appellate Court found in favor of 
the local property owners, denying the use of eminent domain. The majority opinion in Kaur 
applied logic laid out Goldstein v. Pataki (DeWitt 2010). 
In a similar regime of development, in September 2017, Amazon issued a Request For 
Proposals (RFP) asking municipalities to submit bids to a site selection process for its second 
corporate headquarters, dubbed HQ2. Cities across the country committed massive resources 
towards developing bids to bring Amazon in, with massive tax benefits packages being a 
common thread across them. Ultimately Amazon announced two winners – Washington, D.C., 
and New York City. The two cities offered incentive packages amounting to a combined $5.5 
billion ($3 billion from New York City and $2.5 billion from Washington, D.C.), exceeding the 
$5 billion that Amazon itself committed to invest (Bauerlein, Vielkind, and McKinnnon 2018). 
In New York, local lawmakers, activists, and community organizers formed a fierce coalition 
against the development, centering the massive financial giveaway as unwarranted for Amazon’s 
private development, and referencing similar development projects including Atlantic 
Yard/Pacific Park. On Valentines Day 2019, Amazon withdrew from its plan to build a second 
headquarters in New York City (Goodman 2019). The struggle over the Atlantic Yards project 
fits into a lineage of how New Yorkers conceive of development and its values. The relationship 
between policy, legality, and spatiality, was made more legible through the resistance to the 
Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project. 
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This thesis’ second chapter laid out the theoretical framework that guided the ensuing 
analysis, focusing largely on the interplay between critical legal geography and new frameworks 
of scale arising from feminist geography. Flat ontology and nomosphericity were given 
particular attention, in that both theoretical models take into account the spatial and legal 
positionality of different actors while drawing attention to how material reality often challenges 
conventional notions of scale, space, and the law.  
In the third chapter I reviewed eminent domain as a legal doctrine, providing a backdrop 
against which the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park struggles can be situated. Eminent domain’s 
evolutions, and the expanding definition of “public use” or “public benefit” played out in the 
project’s developers’ and opponents’ respective legal and social strategies. Legal recourse 
offered through eminent domain provided a platform from which the project’s opponents could 
exercise power and simultaneously perform spatiality and legality.  
In the fourth chapter I described the project as an historically embedded site. The 
entangled development regimes, planning processes and claims to space, both in Brooklyn at 
large and at the project site specifically, inform the debate around the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park 
development project. Understanding the site’s lineage and how the project came to be situates 
the debates around the project and the site as it exists today. 
The fifth chapter described the project developers’ approach to development. It examined 
legal and spatial artifacts that contributed to their claim to space. Particular focus was given to 
the Empire State Development Corporation Blight Study, which used maps, spatial technology 
and analysis to build both the legal and economic case for the development project. In the sixth 
chapter I analyzed textual artifacts produced by the project’s opponents as they exercised social 
and legal power to fight and delay the Atlantic Yards development. Of key importance in these 
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documents were the ways in which both the developers and opponents produce scalar and spatial 
positionalities intended to concretize their claims to space. 
The seventh chapter examined the relationship between the legal and the spatial as 
challenges to the use of eminent domain flowed through federal and state court systems. A 
critical legal geographic framework was used to deconstruct the legal documents and decisions, 
which points to how in the case of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park conflict conventional spatial 
positions served to normalize conventional legal frameworks, and vice versa. 
The eminent domain cases that initially challenged the development ended, but a slew of 
smaller challenges on other grounds cropped up in the intervening years. The persistence of both 
these legal interventions against the development and their outcomes underscores the role of 
legal practice in placemaking. The massive rift between the project’s original plan and timeline 
and the current state of affairs demonstrates how legal practice and spatial practice are 
intertwined, and how material reality comes into being through the negotiation of both. Neither 
the spatial and scalar imaginations of the developers nor those of the project’s opponents have 
come to be in their entirety. The project’s opponents willingly framed themselves as hyper-local, 
situated at a finer-grained scale below city and state politics, and global capital. Their impact on 
the actual built space confounds the very hierarchical imagination that they adopted, suggesting a 
flat topology.  
Competing imaginations, deployed discursively in the claim to space, were performed 
through both spatial and legal practice. The resulting site – the flat nomosphere that coexists on 
the project footprint -  illuminates the cracks in normative conceptions of scale and law. Eminent 
domain as a doctrine is rife with conflict and contradictions. The judiciary’s unwillingness to 
clearly delineate or rule on what constitutes a ‘public benefit’ has given rise to an area of legal 
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practice inherently wrapped up in claims to space. All the while, this legal practice serves to 
situate the spatial within the legal, or to erase space and scale from its considerations. The legal 
battles over the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project that played out in federal and state courts 
demonstrate this tendency in the law.  
The constantly evolving nature of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park project makes it a rich 
subject for analysis, and a challenging one. The project plans have changed countless times. All 
the while, the original attributes that were meant to constitute a public use or benefit have been 
for the most part unrealized. Norman Oder, whose watchdog blog Atlantic Yards / Pacific Park 
Report began tracking the project and its conflicts in 2008, continues to follow and report on the 
project. While the legal and social resistance to the project impacted the ways in which the site as 
it stands today came to be, it is hard to decipher exactly what actions had which effects. The 
2008 global recession surely impacted the development timeline, as did the changing ownership 
of the project. While specific outcomes might not be clearly attributable to the residents that 
formed Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn and opposed the project, the legal action, activism, and 
textual artifacts produced along the way illuminate the relationship between law and space. 
Despite its position at the intersection of space and law, public seizure through eminent 
domain has been given little regard by geographers. Eminent domain offers a valuable 
intervention to analyze the ways in which spatiality and legality give way to one another. 
Stepping away from the common framing of eminent domain as a legal or political power and re-
conceptualizing eminent domain as a socio-legal process characterized by its tendency to 
transcend and transmute scalar imaginaries brings into focus and problematize the complex 
operations of scale. Situating eminent domain within critical legal and feminist geographic 
frameworks brings disparate sub-disciplines into conversation with one another, and may open 
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up further avenues for analysis. As evidenced in the case of the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park 
project, the analyses provided by re-conceptualizing eminent domain provides new and valuable 
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